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c1b91b008438d24cba2cff532a4657faedf9754b
tubestation/netwerk/protocol/http/nsHttpChannelAuthProvider.cpp
Nicholas Nethercote c1b91b0084 Bug 1436655 - Introduce a mechanism for VarCache prefs to be defined entirely in the binary. r=glandium 
Currently VarCache prefs are setup in two parts:

- The vanilla pref part, installed via a data file such as all.js, or via an
  API call.

- The VarCache variable part, setup by an Add*VarCache() call.

Both parts are needed for the pref to actually operate as a proper VarCache
pref. (There are various prefs for which we do one but not the other unless a
certain condition is met.)

This patch introduces a new way of doing things. There is a new file,
modules/libpref/init/StaticPrefList.h, which defines prefs like this:

> VARCACHE_PREF(
>   "layout.accessiblecaret.width",
>   layout_accessiblecaret_width,
>   float, 34.0
> )

This replaces both the existing parts.

The preprocessor is used to generate multiple things from this single
definition:

- A global variable (the VarCache itself).

- A getter for that global variable.

- A call to an init function that unconditionally installs the pref in the
  prefs hash table at startup.

C++ files can include the new StaticPrefs.h file to access the getter.

Rust code cannot use the getter, but can access the global variable directly
via structs.rs. This is similar to how things currently work for Rust code.

Non-VarCache prefs can also be declared in StaticPrefList.h, using PREF instead
of the VARCACHE_PREF.

The new approach has the following advantages.

+ It eliminates the duplication (in all.js and the Add*VarCache() call) of the
  pref name and default value, preventing potential mismatches. (This is a real
  problem in practice!)

+ There is now a single initialization point for these VarCache prefs.
  + This avoids need to find a place to insert the Add*VarCache() calls, which
    are currently spread all over the place.
  + It also eliminates the common pattern whereby these calls are wrapped in a
    execute-once block protected by a static boolean (see bug 1346224).
  + It's no longer possible to have a VarCache pref for which only one of the
    pieces has been setup.

+ It encapsulates the VarCache global variable, so there is no need to declare
  it separately.

+ VarCache reads are done via a getter (e.g. StaticPrefs::foo_bar_baz())
  instead of a raw global variable read.
  + This makes it clearer that you're reading a pref value, and easier to
    search for uses.
  + This prevents accidental writes to the global variable.
  + This prevents accidental mistyping of the pref name.
  + This provides a single chokepoint in the code for such accesses, which make
    adding checking and instrumentation feasible.

+ It subsumes MediaPrefs, and will allow that class to be removed. (gfxPrefs is
  a harder lift, unfortunately.)

+ Once all VarCache prefs are migrated to the new approach, the VarCache
  mechanism will be better encapsulated, with fewer details publicly visible.

+ (Future work) This will allow the pref names to be stored statically, saving
  memory in every process.

The main downside of the new approach is that all of these prefs are in a
single header that is included in quite a few places, so any changes to this
header will cause a fair amount of recompilation.

Another minor downside is that all VarCache prefs are defined and visible from
start-up. For test-only prefs like network.predictor.doing-tests, having them
show in about:config isn't particularly useful.

The patch also moves three network VarCache prefs to the new mechanism as a
basic demonstration. (And note the inconsistencies in the multiple initial
values that were provided for
network.auth.subresource-img-cross-origin-http-auth-allow!) There will be
numerous follow-up bugs to convert the remaining VarCache prefs.

MozReview-Commit-ID: 9ABNpOR16uW
* * *
[mq]: fixup

MozReview-Commit-ID: 6ToT9dQjIAq
2018-03-26 09:39:40 +11:00

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/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 4; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */
/* vim:set expandtab ts=4 sw=4 sts=4 cin: */
/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
// HttpLog.h should generally be included first
#include "HttpLog.h"
#include "mozilla/Preferences.h"
#include "nsHttpChannelAuthProvider.h"
#include "nsNetUtil.h"
#include "nsHttpHandler.h"
#include "nsIHttpAuthenticator.h"
#include "nsIHttpChannelInternal.h"
#include "nsIAuthPrompt2.h"
#include "nsIAuthPromptProvider.h"
#include "nsIInterfaceRequestor.h"
#include "nsIInterfaceRequestorUtils.h"
#include "nsEscape.h"
#include "nsAuthInformationHolder.h"
#include "nsIStringBundle.h"
#include "nsIPrompt.h"
#include "netCore.h"
#include "nsIHttpAuthenticableChannel.h"
#include "nsIURI.h"
#include "nsContentUtils.h"
#include "nsServiceManagerUtils.h"
#include "nsILoadContext.h"
#include "nsIURL.h"
#include "mozilla/StaticPrefs.h"
#include "mozilla/Telemetry.h"
#include "nsIProxiedChannel.h"
#include "nsIProxyInfo.h"
namespace mozilla {
namespace net {
#define SUBRESOURCE_AUTH_DIALOG_DISALLOW_ALL 0
#define SUBRESOURCE_AUTH_DIALOG_DISALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN 1
#define SUBRESOURCE_AUTH_DIALOG_ALLOW_ALL 2
#define HTTP_AUTH_DIALOG_TOP_LEVEL_DOC 29
#define HTTP_AUTH_DIALOG_SAME_ORIGIN_SUBRESOURCE 30
#define HTTP_AUTH_DIALOG_SAME_ORIGIN_XHR 31
#define HTTP_AUTH_DIALOG_NON_WEB_CONTENT 32
#define HTTP_AUTH_BASIC_INSECURE 0
#define HTTP_AUTH_BASIC_SECURE 1
#define HTTP_AUTH_DIGEST_INSECURE 2
#define HTTP_AUTH_DIGEST_SECURE 3
#define HTTP_AUTH_NTLM_INSECURE 4
#define HTTP_AUTH_NTLM_SECURE 5
#define HTTP_AUTH_NEGOTIATE_INSECURE 6
#define HTTP_AUTH_NEGOTIATE_SECURE 7
#define MAX_DISPLAYED_USER_LENGTH 64
#define MAX_DISPLAYED_HOST_LENGTH 64
static void
GetOriginAttributesSuffix(nsIChannel* aChan, nsACString &aSuffix)
{
OriginAttributes oa;
// Deliberately ignoring the result and going with defaults
if (aChan) {
NS_GetOriginAttributes(aChan, oa);
}
oa.CreateSuffix(aSuffix);
}
nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::nsHttpChannelAuthProvider()
: mAuthChannel(nullptr)
, mPort(-1)
, mUsingSSL(false)
, mProxyUsingSSL(false)
, mIsPrivate(false)
, mProxyAuthContinuationState(nullptr)
, mAuthContinuationState(nullptr)
, mProxyAuth(false)
, mTriedProxyAuth(false)
, mTriedHostAuth(false)
, mSuppressDefensiveAuth(false)
, mCrossOrigin(false)
, mConnectionBased(false)
, mHttpHandler(gHttpHandler)
{
}
nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::~nsHttpChannelAuthProvider()
{
MOZ_ASSERT(!mAuthChannel, "Disconnect wasn't called");
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::Init(nsIHttpAuthenticableChannel *channel)
{
MOZ_ASSERT(channel, "channel expected!");
mAuthChannel = channel;
nsresult rv = mAuthChannel->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(mURI));
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
rv = mAuthChannel->GetIsSSL(&mUsingSSL);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
nsCOMPtr<nsIProxiedChannel> proxied(do_QueryInterface(channel));
if (proxied) {
nsCOMPtr<nsIProxyInfo> pi;
rv = proxied->GetProxyInfo(getter_AddRefs(pi));
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
if (pi) {
nsAutoCString proxyType;
rv = pi->GetType(proxyType);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
mProxyUsingSSL = proxyType.EqualsLiteral("https");
}
}
rv = mURI->GetAsciiHost(mHost);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
// reject the URL if it doesn't specify a host
if (mHost.IsEmpty())
return NS_ERROR_MALFORMED_URI;
rv = mURI->GetPort(&mPort);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
nsCOMPtr<nsIChannel> bareChannel = do_QueryInterface(channel);
mIsPrivate = NS_UsePrivateBrowsing(bareChannel);
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::ProcessAuthentication(uint32_t httpStatus,
bool SSLConnectFailed)
{
LOG(("nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::ProcessAuthentication "
"[this=%p channel=%p code=%u SSLConnectFailed=%d]\n",
this, mAuthChannel, httpStatus, SSLConnectFailed));
MOZ_ASSERT(mAuthChannel, "Channel not initialized");
nsCOMPtr<nsIProxyInfo> proxyInfo;
nsresult rv = mAuthChannel->GetProxyInfo(getter_AddRefs(proxyInfo));
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
if (proxyInfo) {
mProxyInfo = do_QueryInterface(proxyInfo);
if (!mProxyInfo) return NS_ERROR_NO_INTERFACE;
}
nsAutoCString challenges;
mProxyAuth = (httpStatus == 407);
rv = PrepareForAuthentication(mProxyAuth);
if (NS_FAILED(rv))
return rv;
if (mProxyAuth) {
// only allow a proxy challenge if we have a proxy server configured.
// otherwise, we could inadvertently expose the user's proxy
// credentials to an origin server. We could attempt to proceed as
// if we had received a 401 from the server, but why risk flirting
// with trouble? IE similarly rejects 407s when a proxy server is
// not configured, so there's no reason not to do the same.
if (!UsingHttpProxy()) {
LOG(("rejecting 407 when proxy server not configured!\n"));
return NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED;
}
if (UsingSSL() && !SSLConnectFailed) {
// we need to verify that this challenge came from the proxy
// server itself, and not some server on the other side of the
// SSL tunnel.
LOG(("rejecting 407 from origin server!\n"));
return NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED;
}
rv = mAuthChannel->GetProxyChallenges(challenges);
}
else
rv = mAuthChannel->GetWWWChallenges(challenges);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
nsAutoCString creds;
rv = GetCredentials(challenges.get(), mProxyAuth, creds);
if (rv == NS_ERROR_IN_PROGRESS)
return rv;
if (NS_FAILED(rv))
LOG(("unable to authenticate\n"));
else {
// set the authentication credentials
if (mProxyAuth)
rv = mAuthChannel->SetProxyCredentials(creds);
else
rv = mAuthChannel->SetWWWCredentials(creds);
}
return rv;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::AddAuthorizationHeaders(bool aDontUseCachedWWWCreds)
{
LOG(("nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::AddAuthorizationHeaders? "
"[this=%p channel=%p]\n", this, mAuthChannel));
MOZ_ASSERT(mAuthChannel, "Channel not initialized");
nsCOMPtr<nsIProxyInfo> proxyInfo;
nsresult rv = mAuthChannel->GetProxyInfo(getter_AddRefs(proxyInfo));
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
if (proxyInfo) {
mProxyInfo = do_QueryInterface(proxyInfo);
if (!mProxyInfo) return NS_ERROR_NO_INTERFACE;
}
uint32_t loadFlags;
rv = mAuthChannel->GetLoadFlags(&loadFlags);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
// this getter never fails
nsHttpAuthCache *authCache = gHttpHandler->AuthCache(mIsPrivate);
// check if proxy credentials should be sent
const char *proxyHost = ProxyHost();
if (proxyHost && UsingHttpProxy()) {
SetAuthorizationHeader(authCache, nsHttp::Proxy_Authorization,
"http", proxyHost, ProxyPort(),
nullptr, // proxy has no path
mProxyIdent);
}
if (loadFlags & nsIRequest::LOAD_ANONYMOUS) {
LOG(("Skipping Authorization header for anonymous load\n"));
return NS_OK;
}
if (aDontUseCachedWWWCreds) {
LOG(("Authorization header already present:"
" skipping adding auth header from cache\n"));
return NS_OK;
}
// check if server credentials should be sent
nsAutoCString path, scheme;
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(GetCurrentPath(path)) &&
NS_SUCCEEDED(mURI->GetScheme(scheme))) {
SetAuthorizationHeader(authCache, nsHttp::Authorization,
scheme.get(),
Host(),
Port(),
path.get(),
mIdent);
}
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::CheckForSuperfluousAuth()
{
LOG(("nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::CheckForSuperfluousAuth? "
"[this=%p channel=%p]\n", this, mAuthChannel));
MOZ_ASSERT(mAuthChannel, "Channel not initialized");
// we've been called because it has been determined that this channel is
// getting loaded without taking the userpass from the URL. if the URL
// contained a userpass, then (provided some other conditions are true),
// we'll give the user an opportunity to abort the channel as this might be
// an attempt to spoof a different site (see bug 232567).
if (!ConfirmAuth("SuperfluousAuth", true)) {
// calling cancel here sets our mStatus and aborts the HTTP
// transaction, which prevents OnDataAvailable events.
Unused << mAuthChannel->Cancel(NS_ERROR_ABORT);
return NS_ERROR_ABORT;
}
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::Cancel(nsresult status)
{
MOZ_ASSERT(mAuthChannel, "Channel not initialized");
if (mAsyncPromptAuthCancelable) {
mAsyncPromptAuthCancelable->Cancel(status);
mAsyncPromptAuthCancelable = nullptr;
}
if (mGenerateCredentialsCancelable) {
mGenerateCredentialsCancelable->Cancel(status);
mGenerateCredentialsCancelable = nullptr;
}
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::Disconnect(nsresult status)
{
mAuthChannel = nullptr;
if (mAsyncPromptAuthCancelable) {
mAsyncPromptAuthCancelable->Cancel(status);
mAsyncPromptAuthCancelable = nullptr;
}
if (mGenerateCredentialsCancelable) {
mGenerateCredentialsCancelable->Cancel(status);
mGenerateCredentialsCancelable = nullptr;
}
NS_IF_RELEASE(mProxyAuthContinuationState);
NS_IF_RELEASE(mAuthContinuationState);
return NS_OK;
}
// buf contains "domain\user"
static void
ParseUserDomain(char16_t *buf,
const char16_t **user,
const char16_t **domain)
{
char16_t *p = buf;
while (*p && *p != '\\') ++p;
if (!*p)
return;
*p = '\0';
*domain = buf;
*user = p + 1;
}
// helper function for setting identity from raw user:pass
static void
SetIdent(nsHttpAuthIdentity &ident,
uint32_t authFlags,
char16_t *userBuf,
char16_t *passBuf)
{
const char16_t *user = userBuf;
const char16_t *domain = nullptr;
if (authFlags & nsIHttpAuthenticator::IDENTITY_INCLUDES_DOMAIN)
ParseUserDomain(userBuf, &user, &domain);
DebugOnly<nsresult> rv = ident.Set(domain, user, passBuf);
MOZ_ASSERT(NS_SUCCEEDED(rv));
}
// helper function for getting an auth prompt from an interface requestor
static void
GetAuthPrompt(nsIInterfaceRequestor *ifreq, bool proxyAuth,
nsIAuthPrompt2 **result)
{
if (!ifreq)
return;
uint32_t promptReason;
if (proxyAuth)
promptReason = nsIAuthPromptProvider::PROMPT_PROXY;
else
promptReason = nsIAuthPromptProvider::PROMPT_NORMAL;
nsCOMPtr<nsIAuthPromptProvider> promptProvider = do_GetInterface(ifreq);
if (promptProvider)
promptProvider->GetAuthPrompt(promptReason,
NS_GET_IID(nsIAuthPrompt2),
reinterpret_cast<void**>(result));
else
NS_QueryAuthPrompt2(ifreq, result);
}
// generate credentials for the given challenge, and update the auth cache.
nsresult
nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::GenCredsAndSetEntry(nsIHttpAuthenticator *auth,
bool proxyAuth,
const char *scheme,
const char *host,
int32_t port,
const char *directory,
const char *realm,
const char *challenge,
const nsHttpAuthIdentity &ident,
nsCOMPtr<nsISupports> &sessionState,
char **result)
{
nsresult rv;
nsISupports *ss = sessionState;
// set informations that depend on whether
// we're authenticating against a proxy
// or a webserver
nsISupports **continuationState;
if (proxyAuth) {
continuationState = &mProxyAuthContinuationState;
} else {
continuationState = &mAuthContinuationState;
}
rv = auth->GenerateCredentialsAsync(mAuthChannel,
this,
challenge,
proxyAuth,
ident.Domain(),
ident.User(),
ident.Password(),
ss,
*continuationState,
getter_AddRefs(mGenerateCredentialsCancelable));
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
// Calling generate credentials async, results will be dispatched to the
// main thread by calling OnCredsGenerated method
return NS_ERROR_IN_PROGRESS;
}
uint32_t generateFlags;
rv = auth->GenerateCredentials(mAuthChannel,
challenge,
proxyAuth,
ident.Domain(),
ident.User(),
ident.Password(),
&ss,
&*continuationState,
&generateFlags,
result);
sessionState.swap(ss);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
// don't log this in release build since it could contain sensitive info.
#ifdef DEBUG
LOG(("generated creds: %s\n", *result));
#endif
return UpdateCache(auth, scheme, host, port, directory, realm,
challenge, ident, *result, generateFlags, sessionState);
}
nsresult
nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::UpdateCache(nsIHttpAuthenticator *auth,
const char *scheme,
const char *host,
int32_t port,
const char *directory,
const char *realm,
const char *challenge,
const nsHttpAuthIdentity &ident,
const char *creds,
uint32_t generateFlags,
nsISupports *sessionState)
{
nsresult rv;
uint32_t authFlags;
rv = auth->GetAuthFlags(&authFlags);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
// find out if this authenticator allows reuse of credentials and/or
// challenge.
bool saveCreds =
0 != (authFlags & nsIHttpAuthenticator::REUSABLE_CREDENTIALS);
bool saveChallenge =
0 != (authFlags & nsIHttpAuthenticator::REUSABLE_CHALLENGE);
bool saveIdentity =
0 == (generateFlags & nsIHttpAuthenticator::USING_INTERNAL_IDENTITY);
// this getter never fails
nsHttpAuthCache *authCache = gHttpHandler->AuthCache(mIsPrivate);
nsCOMPtr<nsIChannel> chan = do_QueryInterface(mAuthChannel);
nsAutoCString suffix;
GetOriginAttributesSuffix(chan, suffix);
// create a cache entry. we do this even though we don't yet know that
// these credentials are valid b/c we need to avoid prompting the user
// more than once in case the credentials are valid.
//
// if the credentials are not reusable, then we don't bother sticking
// them in the auth cache.
rv = authCache->SetAuthEntry(scheme, host, port, directory, realm,
saveCreds ? creds : nullptr,
saveChallenge ? challenge : nullptr,
suffix,
saveIdentity ? &ident : nullptr,
sessionState);
return rv;
}
nsresult
nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::PrepareForAuthentication(bool proxyAuth)
{
LOG(("nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::PrepareForAuthentication "
"[this=%p channel=%p]\n", this, mAuthChannel));
if (!proxyAuth) {
// reset the current proxy continuation state because our last
// authentication attempt was completed successfully.
NS_IF_RELEASE(mProxyAuthContinuationState);
LOG((" proxy continuation state has been reset"));
}
if (!UsingHttpProxy() || mProxyAuthType.IsEmpty())
return NS_OK;
// We need to remove any Proxy_Authorization header left over from a
// non-request based authentication handshake (e.g., for NTLM auth).
nsAutoCString contractId;
contractId.AssignLiteral(NS_HTTP_AUTHENTICATOR_CONTRACTID_PREFIX);
contractId.Append(mProxyAuthType);
nsresult rv;
nsCOMPtr<nsIHttpAuthenticator> precedingAuth =
do_GetService(contractId.get(), &rv);
if (NS_FAILED(rv))
return rv;
uint32_t precedingAuthFlags;
rv = precedingAuth->GetAuthFlags(&precedingAuthFlags);
if (NS_FAILED(rv))
return rv;
if (!(precedingAuthFlags & nsIHttpAuthenticator::REQUEST_BASED)) {
nsAutoCString challenges;
rv = mAuthChannel->GetProxyChallenges(challenges);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
// delete the proxy authorization header because we weren't
// asked to authenticate
rv = mAuthChannel->SetProxyCredentials(EmptyCString());
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
LOG((" cleared proxy authorization header"));
}
}
return NS_OK;
}
nsresult
nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::GetCredentials(const char *challenges,
bool proxyAuth,
nsCString& creds)
{
nsCOMPtr<nsIHttpAuthenticator> auth;
nsAutoCString challenge;
nsCString authType; // force heap allocation to enable string sharing since
// we'll be assigning this value into mAuthType.
// set informations that depend on whether we're authenticating against a
// proxy or a webserver
nsISupports **currentContinuationState;
nsCString *currentAuthType;
if (proxyAuth) {
currentContinuationState = &mProxyAuthContinuationState;
currentAuthType = &mProxyAuthType;
} else {
currentContinuationState = &mAuthContinuationState;
currentAuthType = &mAuthType;
}
nsresult rv = NS_ERROR_NOT_AVAILABLE;
bool gotCreds = false;
// figure out which challenge we can handle and which authenticator to use.
for (const char *eol = challenges - 1; eol; ) {
const char *p = eol + 1;
// get the challenge string (LF separated -- see nsHttpHeaderArray)
if ((eol = strchr(p, '\n')) != nullptr)
challenge.Assign(p, eol - p);
else
challenge.Assign(p);
rv = GetAuthenticator(challenge.get(), authType, getter_AddRefs(auth));
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
//
// if we've already selected an auth type from a previous challenge
// received while processing this channel, then skip others until
// we find a challenge corresponding to the previously tried auth
// type.
//
if (!currentAuthType->IsEmpty() && authType != *currentAuthType)
continue;
//
// we allow the routines to run all the way through before we
// decide if they are valid.
//
// we don't worry about the auth cache being altered because that
// would have been the last step, and if the error is from updating
// the authcache it wasn't really altered anyway. -CTN
//
// at this point the code is really only useful for client side
// errors (it will not automatically fail over to do a different
// auth type if the server keeps rejecting what is being sent, even
// if a particular auth method only knows 1 thing, like a
// non-identity based authentication method)
//
rv = GetCredentialsForChallenge(challenge.get(), authType.get(),
proxyAuth, auth, creds);
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
gotCreds = true;
*currentAuthType = authType;
break;
}
if (rv == NS_ERROR_IN_PROGRESS) {
// authentication prompt has been invoked and result is
// expected asynchronously, save current challenge being
// processed and all remaining challenges to use later in
// OnAuthAvailable and now immediately return
mCurrentChallenge = challenge;
mRemainingChallenges = eol ? eol+1 : nullptr;
return rv;
}
// reset the auth type and continuation state
NS_IF_RELEASE(*currentContinuationState);
currentAuthType->Truncate();
}
}
if (!gotCreds && !currentAuthType->IsEmpty()) {
// looks like we never found the auth type we were looking for.
// reset the auth type and continuation state, and try again.
currentAuthType->Truncate();
NS_IF_RELEASE(*currentContinuationState);
rv = GetCredentials(challenges, proxyAuth, creds);
}
return rv;
}
nsresult
nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::GetAuthorizationMembers(bool proxyAuth,
nsACString& scheme,
const char*& host,
int32_t& port,
nsACString& path,
nsHttpAuthIdentity*& ident,
nsISupports**& continuationState)
{
if (proxyAuth) {
MOZ_ASSERT (UsingHttpProxy(),
"proxyAuth is true, but no HTTP proxy is configured!");
host = ProxyHost();
port = ProxyPort();
ident = &mProxyIdent;
scheme.AssignLiteral("http");
continuationState = &mProxyAuthContinuationState;
}
else {
host = Host();
port = Port();
ident = &mIdent;
nsresult rv;
rv = GetCurrentPath(path);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
rv = mURI->GetScheme(scheme);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
continuationState = &mAuthContinuationState;
}
return NS_OK;
}
nsresult
nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::GetCredentialsForChallenge(const char *challenge,
const char *authType,
bool proxyAuth,
nsIHttpAuthenticator *auth,
nsCString& creds)
{
LOG(("nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::GetCredentialsForChallenge "
"[this=%p channel=%p proxyAuth=%d challenges=%s]\n",
this, mAuthChannel, proxyAuth, challenge));
// this getter never fails
nsHttpAuthCache *authCache = gHttpHandler->AuthCache(mIsPrivate);
uint32_t authFlags;
nsresult rv = auth->GetAuthFlags(&authFlags);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
nsAutoCString realm;
ParseRealm(challenge, realm);
// if no realm, then use the auth type as the realm. ToUpperCase so the
// ficticious realm stands out a bit more.
// XXX this will cause some single signon misses!
// XXX this was meant to be used with NTLM, which supplies no realm.
/*
if (realm.IsEmpty()) {
realm = authType;
ToUpperCase(realm);
}
*/
// set informations that depend on whether
// we're authenticating against a proxy
// or a webserver
const char *host;
int32_t port;
nsHttpAuthIdentity *ident;
nsAutoCString path, scheme;
bool identFromURI = false;
nsISupports **continuationState;
rv = GetAuthorizationMembers(proxyAuth, scheme, host, port,
path, ident, continuationState);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
uint32_t loadFlags;
rv = mAuthChannel->GetLoadFlags(&loadFlags);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
if (!proxyAuth) {
// if this is the first challenge, then try using the identity
// specified in the URL.
if (mIdent.IsEmpty()) {
GetIdentityFromURI(authFlags, mIdent);
identFromURI = !mIdent.IsEmpty();
}
if ((loadFlags & nsIRequest::LOAD_ANONYMOUS) && !identFromURI) {
LOG(("Skipping authentication for anonymous non-proxy request\n"));
return NS_ERROR_NOT_AVAILABLE;
}
// Let explicit URL credentials pass
// regardless of the LOAD_ANONYMOUS flag
}
else if ((loadFlags & nsIRequest::LOAD_ANONYMOUS) && !UsingHttpProxy()) {
LOG(("Skipping authentication for anonymous non-proxy request\n"));
return NS_ERROR_NOT_AVAILABLE;
}
nsCOMPtr<nsIChannel> chan = do_QueryInterface(mAuthChannel);
nsAutoCString suffix;
GetOriginAttributesSuffix(chan, suffix);
//
// if we already tried some credentials for this transaction, then
// we need to possibly clear them from the cache, unless the credentials
// in the cache have changed, in which case we'd want to give them a
// try instead.
//
nsHttpAuthEntry *entry = nullptr;
Unused << authCache->GetAuthEntryForDomain(scheme.get(), host, port,
realm.get(), suffix, &entry);
// hold reference to the auth session state (in case we clear our
// reference to the entry).
nsCOMPtr<nsISupports> sessionStateGrip;
if (entry)
sessionStateGrip = entry->mMetaData;
// remember if we already had the continuation state. it means we are in
// the middle of the authentication exchange and the connection must be
// kept sticky then (and only then).
bool authAtProgress = !!*continuationState;
// for digest auth, maybe our cached nonce value simply timed out...
bool identityInvalid;
nsISupports *sessionState = sessionStateGrip;
rv = auth->ChallengeReceived(mAuthChannel,
challenge,
proxyAuth,
&sessionState,
&*continuationState,
&identityInvalid);
sessionStateGrip.swap(sessionState);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
LOG((" identity invalid = %d\n", identityInvalid));
if (mConnectionBased && identityInvalid) {
// If the flag is set and identity is invalid, it means we received the first
// challange for a new negotiation round after negotiating a connection based
// auth failed (invalid password).
// The mConnectionBased flag is set later for the newly received challenge,
// so here it reflects the previous 401/7 response schema.
rv = mAuthChannel->CloseStickyConnection();
MOZ_ASSERT(NS_SUCCEEDED(rv));
if (!proxyAuth) {
// We must clear proxy ident in the following scenario + explanation:
// - we are authenticating to an NTLM proxy and an NTLM server
// - we successfully authenticated to the proxy, mProxyIdent keeps
// the user name/domain and password, the identity has also been cached
// - we just threw away the connection because we are now asking for
// creds for the server (WWW auth)
// - hence, we will have to auth to the proxy again as well
// - if we didn't clear the proxy identity, it would be considered
// as non-valid and we would ask the user again ; clearing it forces
// use of the cached identity and not asking the user again
mProxyIdent.Clear();
}
}
mConnectionBased = !!(authFlags & nsIHttpAuthenticator::CONNECTION_BASED);
// It's legal if the peer closes the connection after the first 401/7.
// Making the connection sticky will prevent its restart giving the user
// a 'network reset' error every time. Hence, we mark the connection
// as restartable.
mAuthChannel->ConnectionRestartable(!authAtProgress);
if (identityInvalid) {
if (entry) {
if (ident->Equals(entry->Identity())) {
if (!identFromURI) {
LOG((" clearing bad auth cache entry\n"));
// ok, we've already tried this user identity, so clear the
// corresponding entry from the auth cache.
authCache->ClearAuthEntry(scheme.get(), host,
port, realm.get(),
suffix);
entry = nullptr;
ident->Clear();
}
}
else if (!identFromURI ||
(nsCRT::strcmp(ident->User(),
entry->Identity().User()) == 0 &&
!(loadFlags &
(nsIChannel::LOAD_ANONYMOUS |
nsIChannel::LOAD_EXPLICIT_CREDENTIALS)))) {
LOG((" taking identity from auth cache\n"));
// the password from the auth cache is more likely to be
// correct than the one in the URL. at least, we know that it
// works with the given username. it is possible for a server
// to distinguish logons based on the supplied password alone,
// but that would be quite unusual... and i don't think we need
// to worry about such unorthodox cases.
rv = ident->Set(entry->Identity());
MOZ_ASSERT(NS_SUCCEEDED(rv));
identFromURI = false;
if (entry->Creds()[0] != '\0') {
LOG((" using cached credentials!\n"));
creds.Assign(entry->Creds());
return entry->AddPath(path.get());
}
}
}
else if (!identFromURI) {
// hmm... identity invalid, but no auth entry! the realm probably
// changed (see bug 201986).
ident->Clear();
}
if (!entry && ident->IsEmpty()) {
uint32_t level = nsIAuthPrompt2::LEVEL_NONE;
if ((!proxyAuth && mUsingSSL) || (proxyAuth && mProxyUsingSSL))
level = nsIAuthPrompt2::LEVEL_SECURE;
else if (authFlags & nsIHttpAuthenticator::IDENTITY_ENCRYPTED)
level = nsIAuthPrompt2::LEVEL_PW_ENCRYPTED;
// Collect statistics on how frequently the various types of HTTP
// authentication are used over SSL and non-SSL connections.
if (gHttpHandler->IsTelemetryEnabled()) {
if (NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("basic").LowerCaseEqualsASCII(authType)) {
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::HTTP_AUTH_TYPE_STATS,
UsingSSL() ? HTTP_AUTH_BASIC_SECURE : HTTP_AUTH_BASIC_INSECURE);
} else if (NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("digest").LowerCaseEqualsASCII(authType)) {
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::HTTP_AUTH_TYPE_STATS,
UsingSSL() ? HTTP_AUTH_DIGEST_SECURE : HTTP_AUTH_DIGEST_INSECURE);
} else if (NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("ntlm").LowerCaseEqualsASCII(authType)) {
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::HTTP_AUTH_TYPE_STATS,
UsingSSL() ? HTTP_AUTH_NTLM_SECURE : HTTP_AUTH_NTLM_INSECURE);
} else if (NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("negotiate").LowerCaseEqualsASCII(authType)) {
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::HTTP_AUTH_TYPE_STATS,
UsingSSL() ? HTTP_AUTH_NEGOTIATE_SECURE : HTTP_AUTH_NEGOTIATE_INSECURE);
}
}
// Depending on the pref setting, the authentication dialog may be
// blocked for all sub-resources, blocked for cross-origin
// sub-resources, or always allowed for sub-resources.
// For more details look at the bug 647010.
// BlockPrompt will set mCrossOrigin parameter as well.
if (BlockPrompt(proxyAuth)) {
LOG(("nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::GetCredentialsForChallenge: "
"Prompt is blocked [this=%p pref=%d img-pref=%d "
"non-web-content-triggered-pref=%d]\n",
this,
StaticPrefs::network_auth_subresource_http_auth_allow(),
StaticPrefs::network_auth_subresource_img_cross_origin_http_auth_allow(),
StaticPrefs::network_auth_non_web_content_triggered_resources_http_auth_allow()));
return NS_ERROR_ABORT;
}
// at this point we are forced to interact with the user to get
// their username and password for this domain.
rv = PromptForIdentity(level, proxyAuth, realm.get(),
authType, authFlags, *ident);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
identFromURI = false;
}
}
if (identFromURI) {
// Warn the user before automatically using the identity from the URL
// to automatically log them into a site (see bug 232567).
if (!ConfirmAuth("AutomaticAuth", false)) {
// calling cancel here sets our mStatus and aborts the HTTP
// transaction, which prevents OnDataAvailable events.
rv = mAuthChannel->Cancel(NS_ERROR_ABORT);
MOZ_ASSERT(NS_SUCCEEDED(rv));
// this return code alone is not equivalent to Cancel, since
// it only instructs our caller that authentication failed.
// without an explicit call to Cancel, our caller would just
// load the page that accompanies the HTTP auth challenge.
return NS_ERROR_ABORT;
}
}
//
// get credentials for the given user:pass
//
// always store the credentials we're trying now so that they will be used
// on subsequent links. This will potentially remove good credentials from
// the cache. This is ok as we don't want to use cached credentials if the
// user specified something on the URI or in another manner. This is so
// that we don't transparently authenticate as someone they're not
// expecting to authenticate as.
//
nsCString result;
rv = GenCredsAndSetEntry(auth, proxyAuth, scheme.get(), host, port,
path.get(), realm.get(), challenge, *ident,
sessionStateGrip, getter_Copies(result));
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv))
creds = result;
return rv;
}
bool
nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::BlockPrompt(bool proxyAuth)
{
// Verify that it's ok to prompt for credentials here, per spec
// http://xhr.spec.whatwg.org/#the-send%28%29-method
nsCOMPtr<nsIHttpChannelInternal> chanInternal = do_QueryInterface(mAuthChannel);
MOZ_ASSERT(chanInternal);
if (chanInternal->GetBlockAuthPrompt()) {
LOG(("nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::BlockPrompt: Prompt is blocked "
"[this=%p channel=%p]\n", this, mAuthChannel));
return true;
}
if (proxyAuth) {
// Do not block auth-dialog if this is a proxy authentication.
return false;
}
nsCOMPtr<nsIChannel> chan = do_QueryInterface(mAuthChannel);
nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo;
chan->GetLoadInfo(getter_AddRefs(loadInfo));
// We will treat loads w/o loadInfo as a top level document.
bool topDoc = true;
bool xhr = false;
bool nonWebContent = false;
if (loadInfo) {
if (loadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType() !=
nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT) {
topDoc = false;
}
if (!topDoc) {
nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> triggeringPrinc =
loadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal();
if (nsContentUtils::IsSystemPrincipal(triggeringPrinc)) {
nonWebContent = true;
}
}
if (loadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType() ==
nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_XMLHTTPREQUEST) {
xhr = true;
}
if (!topDoc && !xhr) {
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> topURI;
Unused << chanInternal->GetTopWindowURI(getter_AddRefs(topURI));
if (!topURI) {
// If we do not have topURI try the loadingPrincipal.
nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> loadingPrinc = loadInfo->LoadingPrincipal();
if (loadingPrinc) {
loadingPrinc->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(topURI));
}
}
if (!NS_SecurityCompareURIs(topURI, mURI, true)) {
mCrossOrigin = true;
}
}
}
if (gHttpHandler->IsTelemetryEnabled()) {
if (topDoc) {
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::HTTP_AUTH_DIALOG_STATS_3,
HTTP_AUTH_DIALOG_TOP_LEVEL_DOC);
} else if (nonWebContent) {
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::HTTP_AUTH_DIALOG_STATS_3,
HTTP_AUTH_DIALOG_NON_WEB_CONTENT);
} else if (!mCrossOrigin) {
if (xhr) {
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::HTTP_AUTH_DIALOG_STATS_3,
HTTP_AUTH_DIALOG_SAME_ORIGIN_XHR);
} else {
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::HTTP_AUTH_DIALOG_STATS_3,
HTTP_AUTH_DIALOG_SAME_ORIGIN_SUBRESOURCE);
}
} else {
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::HTTP_AUTH_DIALOG_STATS_3,
loadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType());
}
}
if (!topDoc &&
!StaticPrefs::network_auth_non_web_content_triggered_resources_http_auth_allow() &&
nonWebContent) {
return true;
}
switch (StaticPrefs::network_auth_subresource_http_auth_allow()) {
case SUBRESOURCE_AUTH_DIALOG_DISALLOW_ALL:
// Do not open the http-authentication credentials dialog for
// the sub-resources.
return !topDoc && !xhr;
case SUBRESOURCE_AUTH_DIALOG_DISALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN:
// Open the http-authentication credentials dialog for
// the sub-resources only if they are not cross-origin.
return !topDoc && !xhr && mCrossOrigin;
case SUBRESOURCE_AUTH_DIALOG_ALLOW_ALL:
// Allow the http-authentication dialog for subresources.
// If pref network.auth.subresource-img-cross-origin-http-auth-allow
// is set, http-authentication dialog for image subresources is
// blocked.
if (mCrossOrigin &&
!StaticPrefs::network_auth_subresource_img_cross_origin_http_auth_allow() &&
loadInfo &&
((loadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType() == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_IMAGE) ||
(loadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType() == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_IMAGESET))) {
return true;
}
return false;
default:
// This is an invalid value.
MOZ_ASSERT(false, "A non valid value!");
}
return false;
}
inline void
GetAuthType(const char *challenge, nsCString &authType)
{
const char *p;
// get the challenge type
if ((p = strchr(challenge, ' ')) != nullptr)
authType.Assign(challenge, p - challenge);
else
authType.Assign(challenge);
}
nsresult
nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::GetAuthenticator(const char *challenge,
nsCString &authType,
nsIHttpAuthenticator **auth)
{
LOG(("nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::GetAuthenticator [this=%p channel=%p]\n",
this, mAuthChannel));
GetAuthType(challenge, authType);
// normalize to lowercase
ToLowerCase(authType);
nsAutoCString contractid;
contractid.AssignLiteral(NS_HTTP_AUTHENTICATOR_CONTRACTID_PREFIX);
contractid.Append(authType);
return CallGetService(contractid.get(), auth);
}
void
nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::GetIdentityFromURI(uint32_t authFlags,
nsHttpAuthIdentity &ident)
{
LOG(("nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::GetIdentityFromURI [this=%p channel=%p]\n",
this, mAuthChannel));
nsAutoString userBuf;
nsAutoString passBuf;
// XXX i18n
nsAutoCString buf;
mURI->GetUsername(buf);
if (!buf.IsEmpty()) {
NS_UnescapeURL(buf);
CopyASCIItoUTF16(buf, userBuf);
mURI->GetPassword(buf);
if (!buf.IsEmpty()) {
NS_UnescapeURL(buf);
CopyASCIItoUTF16(buf, passBuf);
}
}
if (!userBuf.IsEmpty()) {
SetIdent(ident, authFlags, (char16_t *) userBuf.get(),
(char16_t *) passBuf.get());
}
}
void
nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::ParseRealm(const char *challenge,
nsACString &realm)
{
//
// From RFC2617 section 1.2, the realm value is defined as such:
//
// realm = "realm" "=" realm-value
// realm-value = quoted-string
//
// but, we'll accept anything after the the "=" up to the first space, or
// end-of-line, if the string is not quoted.
//
const char *p = PL_strcasestr(challenge, "realm=");
if (p) {
bool has_quote = false;
p += 6;
if (*p == '"') {
has_quote = true;
p++;
}
const char *end;
if (has_quote) {
end = p;
while (*end) {
if (*end == '\\') {
// escaped character, store that one instead if not zero
if (!*++end)
break;
}
else if (*end == '\"')
// end of string
break;
realm.Append(*end);
++end;
}
}
else {
// realm given without quotes
end = strchr(p, ' ');
if (end)
realm.Assign(p, end - p);
else
realm.Assign(p);
}
}
}
class nsHTTPAuthInformation : public nsAuthInformationHolder {
public:
nsHTTPAuthInformation(uint32_t aFlags, const nsString& aRealm,
const nsCString& aAuthType)
: nsAuthInformationHolder(aFlags, aRealm, aAuthType) {}
void SetToHttpAuthIdentity(uint32_t authFlags,
nsHttpAuthIdentity& identity);
};
void
nsHTTPAuthInformation::SetToHttpAuthIdentity(uint32_t authFlags,
nsHttpAuthIdentity& identity)
{
DebugOnly<nsresult> rv = identity.Set(Domain().get(), User().get(), Password().get());
MOZ_ASSERT(NS_SUCCEEDED(rv));
}
nsresult
nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::PromptForIdentity(uint32_t level,
bool proxyAuth,
const char *realm,
const char *authType,
uint32_t authFlags,
nsHttpAuthIdentity &ident)
{
LOG(("nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::PromptForIdentity [this=%p channel=%p]\n",
this, mAuthChannel));
nsresult rv;
nsCOMPtr<nsIInterfaceRequestor> callbacks;
rv = mAuthChannel->GetNotificationCallbacks(getter_AddRefs(callbacks));
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
nsCOMPtr<nsILoadGroup> loadGroup;
rv = mAuthChannel->GetLoadGroup(getter_AddRefs(loadGroup));
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
nsCOMPtr<nsIAuthPrompt2> authPrompt;
GetAuthPrompt(callbacks, proxyAuth, getter_AddRefs(authPrompt));
if (!authPrompt && loadGroup) {
nsCOMPtr<nsIInterfaceRequestor> cbs;
loadGroup->GetNotificationCallbacks(getter_AddRefs(cbs));
GetAuthPrompt(cbs, proxyAuth, getter_AddRefs(authPrompt));
}
if (!authPrompt)
return NS_ERROR_NO_INTERFACE;
// XXX i18n: need to support non-ASCII realm strings (see bug 41489)
NS_ConvertASCIItoUTF16 realmU(realm);
// prompt the user...
uint32_t promptFlags = 0;
if (proxyAuth)
{
promptFlags |= nsIAuthInformation::AUTH_PROXY;
if (mTriedProxyAuth)
promptFlags |= nsIAuthInformation::PREVIOUS_FAILED;
mTriedProxyAuth = true;
}
else {
promptFlags |= nsIAuthInformation::AUTH_HOST;
if (mTriedHostAuth)
promptFlags |= nsIAuthInformation::PREVIOUS_FAILED;
mTriedHostAuth = true;
}
if (authFlags & nsIHttpAuthenticator::IDENTITY_INCLUDES_DOMAIN)
promptFlags |= nsIAuthInformation::NEED_DOMAIN;
if (mCrossOrigin) {
promptFlags |= nsIAuthInformation::CROSS_ORIGIN_SUB_RESOURCE;
}
RefPtr<nsHTTPAuthInformation> holder =
new nsHTTPAuthInformation(promptFlags, realmU,
nsDependentCString(authType));
if (!holder)
return NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
nsCOMPtr<nsIChannel> channel(do_QueryInterface(mAuthChannel, &rv));
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
rv =
authPrompt->AsyncPromptAuth(channel, this, nullptr, level, holder,
getter_AddRefs(mAsyncPromptAuthCancelable));
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
// indicate using this error code that authentication prompt
// result is expected asynchronously
rv = NS_ERROR_IN_PROGRESS;
}
else {
// Fall back to synchronous prompt
bool retval = false;
rv = authPrompt->PromptAuth(channel, level, holder, &retval);
if (NS_FAILED(rv))
return rv;
if (!retval)
rv = NS_ERROR_ABORT;
else
holder->SetToHttpAuthIdentity(authFlags, ident);
}
// remember that we successfully showed the user an auth dialog
if (!proxyAuth)
mSuppressDefensiveAuth = true;
if (mConnectionBased) {
// Connection can be reset by the server in the meantime user is entering
// the credentials. Result would be just a "Connection was reset" error.
// Hence, we drop the current regardless if the user would make it on time
// to provide credentials.
// It's OK to send the NTLM type 1 message (response to the plain "NTLM"
// challenge) on a new connection.
{
DebugOnly<nsresult> rv = mAuthChannel->CloseStickyConnection();
MOZ_ASSERT(NS_SUCCEEDED(rv));
}
}
return rv;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::OnAuthAvailable(nsISupports *aContext,
nsIAuthInformation *aAuthInfo)
{
LOG(("nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::OnAuthAvailable [this=%p channel=%p]",
this, mAuthChannel));
mAsyncPromptAuthCancelable = nullptr;
if (!mAuthChannel)
return NS_OK;
nsresult rv;
const char *host;
int32_t port;
nsHttpAuthIdentity *ident;
nsAutoCString path, scheme;
nsISupports **continuationState;
rv = GetAuthorizationMembers(mProxyAuth, scheme, host, port,
path, ident, continuationState);
if (NS_FAILED(rv))
OnAuthCancelled(aContext, false);
nsAutoCString realm;
ParseRealm(mCurrentChallenge.get(), realm);
nsCOMPtr<nsIChannel> chan = do_QueryInterface(mAuthChannel);
nsAutoCString suffix;
GetOriginAttributesSuffix(chan, suffix);
nsHttpAuthCache *authCache = gHttpHandler->AuthCache(mIsPrivate);
nsHttpAuthEntry *entry = nullptr;
Unused << authCache->GetAuthEntryForDomain(scheme.get(), host, port,
realm.get(), suffix,
&entry);
nsCOMPtr<nsISupports> sessionStateGrip;
if (entry)
sessionStateGrip = entry->mMetaData;
nsAuthInformationHolder* holder =
static_cast<nsAuthInformationHolder*>(aAuthInfo);
rv = ident->Set(holder->Domain().get(),
holder->User().get(),
holder->Password().get());
MOZ_ASSERT(NS_SUCCEEDED(rv));
nsAutoCString unused;
nsCOMPtr<nsIHttpAuthenticator> auth;
rv = GetAuthenticator(mCurrentChallenge.get(), unused,
getter_AddRefs(auth));
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
MOZ_ASSERT(false, "GetAuthenticator failed");
OnAuthCancelled(aContext, true);
return NS_OK;
}
nsCString creds;
rv = GenCredsAndSetEntry(auth, mProxyAuth,
scheme.get(), host, port, path.get(),
realm.get(), mCurrentChallenge.get(), *ident,
sessionStateGrip, getter_Copies(creds));
mCurrentChallenge.Truncate();
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
OnAuthCancelled(aContext, true);
return NS_OK;
}
return ContinueOnAuthAvailable(creds);
}
NS_IMETHODIMP nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::OnAuthCancelled(nsISupports *aContext,
bool userCancel)
{
LOG(("nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::OnAuthCancelled [this=%p channel=%p]",
this, mAuthChannel));
mAsyncPromptAuthCancelable = nullptr;
if (!mAuthChannel)
return NS_OK;
// When user cancels or auth fails we want to close the connection for
// connection based schemes like NTLM. Some servers don't like re-negotiation
// on the same connection.
nsresult rv;
if (mConnectionBased) {
rv = mAuthChannel->CloseStickyConnection();
MOZ_ASSERT(NS_SUCCEEDED(rv));
mConnectionBased = false;
}
if (userCancel) {
if (!mRemainingChallenges.IsEmpty()) {
// there are still some challenges to process, do so
// Get rid of current continuationState to avoid reusing it in
// next challenges since it is no longer relevant.
if (mProxyAuth) {
NS_IF_RELEASE(mProxyAuthContinuationState);
} else {
NS_IF_RELEASE(mAuthContinuationState);
}
nsAutoCString creds;
rv = GetCredentials(mRemainingChallenges.get(), mProxyAuth, creds);
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
// GetCredentials loaded the credentials from the cache or
// some other way in a synchronous manner, process those
// credentials now
mRemainingChallenges.Truncate();
return ContinueOnAuthAvailable(creds);
}
if (rv == NS_ERROR_IN_PROGRESS) {
// GetCredentials successfully queued another authprompt for
// a challenge from the list, we are now waiting for the user
// to provide the credentials
return NS_OK;
}
// otherwise, we failed...
}
mRemainingChallenges.Truncate();
}
rv = mAuthChannel->OnAuthCancelled(userCancel);
MOZ_ASSERT(NS_SUCCEEDED(rv));
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::OnCredsGenerated(const char *aGeneratedCreds,
uint32_t aFlags,
nsresult aResult,
nsISupports* aSessionState,
nsISupports* aContinuationState)
{
nsresult rv;
MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
// When channel is closed, do not proceed
if (!mAuthChannel) {
return NS_OK;
}
mGenerateCredentialsCancelable = nullptr;
if (NS_FAILED(aResult)) {
return OnAuthCancelled(nullptr, true);
}
// We want to update m(Proxy)AuthContinuationState in case it was changed by
// nsHttpNegotiateAuth::GenerateCredentials
nsCOMPtr<nsISupports> contState(aContinuationState);
if (mProxyAuth) {
contState.swap(mProxyAuthContinuationState);
} else {
contState.swap(mAuthContinuationState);
}
nsCOMPtr<nsIHttpAuthenticator> auth;
nsAutoCString unused;
rv = GetAuthenticator(mCurrentChallenge.get(), unused, getter_AddRefs(auth));
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
const char *host;
int32_t port;
nsHttpAuthIdentity *ident;
nsAutoCString directory, scheme;
nsISupports **unusedContinuationState;
// Get realm from challenge
nsAutoCString realm;
ParseRealm(mCurrentChallenge.get(), realm);
rv = GetAuthorizationMembers(mProxyAuth, scheme, host, port,
directory, ident, unusedContinuationState);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
rv = UpdateCache(auth, scheme.get(), host, port, directory.get(),
realm.get(), mCurrentChallenge.get(), *ident,
aGeneratedCreds, aFlags, aSessionState);
MOZ_ASSERT(NS_SUCCEEDED(rv));
mCurrentChallenge.Truncate();
rv = ContinueOnAuthAvailable(nsDependentCString(aGeneratedCreds));
MOZ_ASSERT(NS_SUCCEEDED(rv));
return NS_OK;
}
nsresult
nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::ContinueOnAuthAvailable(const nsACString& creds)
{
nsresult rv;
if (mProxyAuth)
rv = mAuthChannel->SetProxyCredentials(creds);
else
rv = mAuthChannel->SetWWWCredentials(creds);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
// drop our remaining list of challenges. We don't need them, because we
// have now authenticated against a challenge and will be sending that
// information to the server (or proxy). If it doesn't accept our
// authentication it'll respond with failure and resend the challenge list
mRemainingChallenges.Truncate();
Unused << mAuthChannel->OnAuthAvailable();
return NS_OK;
}
bool
nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::ConfirmAuth(const char* bundleKey,
bool doYesNoPrompt)
{
// skip prompting the user if
// 1) we've already prompted the user
// 2) we're not a toplevel channel
// 3) the userpass length is less than the "phishy" threshold
uint32_t loadFlags;
nsresult rv = mAuthChannel->GetLoadFlags(&loadFlags);
if (NS_FAILED(rv))
return true;
if (mSuppressDefensiveAuth ||
!(loadFlags & nsIChannel::LOAD_INITIAL_DOCUMENT_URI))
return true;
nsAutoCString userPass;
rv = mURI->GetUserPass(userPass);
if (NS_FAILED(rv) ||
(userPass.Length() < gHttpHandler->PhishyUserPassLength()))
return true;
// we try to confirm by prompting the user. if we cannot do so, then
// assume the user said ok. this is done to keep things working in
// embedded builds, where the string bundle might not be present, etc.
nsCOMPtr<nsIStringBundleService> bundleService =
do_GetService(NS_STRINGBUNDLE_CONTRACTID);
if (!bundleService)
return true;
nsCOMPtr<nsIStringBundle> bundle;
bundleService->CreateBundle(NECKO_MSGS_URL, getter_AddRefs(bundle));
if (!bundle)
return true;
nsAutoCString host;
rv = mURI->GetHost(host);
if (NS_FAILED(rv))
return true;
nsAutoCString user;
rv = mURI->GetUsername(user);
if (NS_FAILED(rv))
return true;
NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16 ucsHost(host), ucsUser(user);
size_t userLength = ucsUser.Length();
if (userLength > MAX_DISPLAYED_USER_LENGTH) {
size_t desiredLength = MAX_DISPLAYED_USER_LENGTH;
// Don't cut off right before a low surrogate. Just include it.
if (NS_IS_LOW_SURROGATE(ucsUser[desiredLength])) {
desiredLength++;
}
ucsUser.Replace(desiredLength, userLength - desiredLength,
nsContentUtils::GetLocalizedEllipsis());
}
size_t hostLen = ucsHost.Length();
if (hostLen > MAX_DISPLAYED_HOST_LENGTH) {
size_t cutPoint = hostLen - MAX_DISPLAYED_HOST_LENGTH;
// Likewise, don't cut off right before a low surrogate here.
// Keep the low surrogate
if (NS_IS_LOW_SURROGATE(ucsHost[cutPoint])) {
cutPoint--;
}
// It's possible cutPoint was 1 and is now 0. Only insert the ellipsis
// if we're actually removing anything.
if (cutPoint > 0) {
ucsHost.Replace(0, cutPoint, nsContentUtils::GetLocalizedEllipsis());
}
}
const char16_t *strs[2] = { ucsHost.get(), ucsUser.get() };
nsAutoString msg;
rv = bundle->FormatStringFromName(bundleKey, strs, 2, msg);
if (NS_FAILED(rv))
return true;
nsCOMPtr<nsIInterfaceRequestor> callbacks;
rv = mAuthChannel->GetNotificationCallbacks(getter_AddRefs(callbacks));
if (NS_FAILED(rv))
return true;
nsCOMPtr<nsILoadGroup> loadGroup;
rv = mAuthChannel->GetLoadGroup(getter_AddRefs(loadGroup));
if (NS_FAILED(rv))
return true;
nsCOMPtr<nsIPrompt> prompt;
NS_QueryNotificationCallbacks(callbacks, loadGroup, NS_GET_IID(nsIPrompt),
getter_AddRefs(prompt));
if (!prompt)
return true;
// do not prompt again
mSuppressDefensiveAuth = true;
bool confirmed;
if (doYesNoPrompt) {
int32_t choice;
bool checkState = false;
rv = prompt->ConfirmEx(nullptr, msg.get(),
nsIPrompt::BUTTON_POS_1_DEFAULT +
nsIPrompt::STD_YES_NO_BUTTONS,
nullptr, nullptr, nullptr, nullptr,
&checkState, &choice);
if (NS_FAILED(rv))
return true;
confirmed = choice == 0;
}
else {
rv = prompt->Confirm(nullptr, msg.get(), &confirmed);
if (NS_FAILED(rv))
return true;
}
return confirmed;
}
void
nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::SetAuthorizationHeader(nsHttpAuthCache *authCache,
nsHttpAtom header,
const char *scheme,
const char *host,
int32_t port,
const char *path,
nsHttpAuthIdentity &ident)
{
nsHttpAuthEntry *entry = nullptr;
nsresult rv;
// set informations that depend on whether
// we're authenticating against a proxy
// or a webserver
nsISupports **continuationState;
if (header == nsHttp::Proxy_Authorization) {
continuationState = &mProxyAuthContinuationState;
} else {
continuationState = &mAuthContinuationState;
}
nsCOMPtr<nsIChannel> chan = do_QueryInterface(mAuthChannel);
nsAutoCString suffix;
GetOriginAttributesSuffix(chan, suffix);
rv = authCache->GetAuthEntryForPath(scheme, host, port, path,
suffix, &entry);
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
// if we are trying to add a header for origin server auth and if the
// URL contains an explicit username, then try the given username first.
// we only want to do this, however, if we know the URL requires auth
// based on the presence of an auth cache entry for this URL (which is
// true since we are here). but, if the username from the URL matches
// the username from the cache, then we should prefer the password
// stored in the cache since that is most likely to be valid.
if (header == nsHttp::Authorization && entry->Domain()[0] == '\0') {
GetIdentityFromURI(0, ident);
// if the usernames match, then clear the ident so we will pick
// up the one from the auth cache instead.
// when this is undesired, specify LOAD_EXPLICIT_CREDENTIALS load
// flag.
if (nsCRT::strcmp(ident.User(), entry->User()) == 0) {
uint32_t loadFlags;
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(mAuthChannel->GetLoadFlags(&loadFlags)) &&
!(loadFlags & nsIChannel::LOAD_EXPLICIT_CREDENTIALS)) {
ident.Clear();
}
}
}
bool identFromURI;
if (ident.IsEmpty()) {
rv = ident.Set(entry->Identity());
MOZ_ASSERT(NS_SUCCEEDED(rv));
identFromURI = false;
}
else
identFromURI = true;
nsCString temp; // this must have the same lifetime as creds
const char *creds = entry->Creds();
const char *challenge = entry->Challenge();
// we can only send a preemptive Authorization header if we have either
// stored credentials or a stored challenge from which to derive
// credentials. if the identity is from the URI, then we cannot use
// the stored credentials.
if ((!creds[0] || identFromURI) && challenge[0]) {
nsCOMPtr<nsIHttpAuthenticator> auth;
nsAutoCString unused;
rv = GetAuthenticator(challenge, unused, getter_AddRefs(auth));
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
bool proxyAuth = (header == nsHttp::Proxy_Authorization);
rv = GenCredsAndSetEntry(auth, proxyAuth, scheme, host, port,
path, entry->Realm(), challenge, ident,
entry->mMetaData, getter_Copies(temp));
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv))
creds = temp.get();
// make sure the continuation state is null since we do not
// support mixing preemptive and 'multirequest' authentication.
NS_IF_RELEASE(*continuationState);
}
}
if (creds[0]) {
LOG((" adding \"%s\" request header\n", header.get()));
if (header == nsHttp::Proxy_Authorization) {
rv = mAuthChannel->SetProxyCredentials(nsDependentCString(creds));
MOZ_ASSERT(NS_SUCCEEDED(rv));
}
else {
rv = mAuthChannel->SetWWWCredentials(nsDependentCString(creds));
MOZ_ASSERT(NS_SUCCEEDED(rv));
}
// suppress defensive auth prompting for this channel since we know
// that we already prompted at least once this session. we only do
// this for non-proxy auth since the URL's userpass is not used for
// proxy auth.
if (header == nsHttp::Authorization)
mSuppressDefensiveAuth = true;
}
else
ident.Clear(); // don't remember the identity
}
}
nsresult
nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::GetCurrentPath(nsACString &path)
{
nsresult rv;
nsCOMPtr<nsIURL> url = do_QueryInterface(mURI);
if (url)
rv = url->GetDirectory(path);
else
rv = mURI->GetPathQueryRef(path);
return rv;
}
NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS(nsHttpChannelAuthProvider, nsICancelable,
nsIHttpChannelAuthProvider, nsIAuthPromptCallback, nsIHttpAuthenticatorCallback)
} // namespace net
} // namespace mozilla
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