a13bccff29
This patch introduces ipcclientcerts, a PKCS#11 module that the socket process can load to get access to client certificates and keys managed by the parent process. This enables client certificate authentication to work with the socket process (particularly for keys stored outside of NSS, as with osclientcerts or third-party PKCS#11 modules). Differential Revision: https://phabricator.services.mozilla.com/D122392
1315 lines
44 KiB
C++
1315 lines
44 KiB
C++
/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 2; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*-
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*
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* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
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* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
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* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
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#include "nsNSSCallbacks.h"
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#include "PSMRunnable.h"
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#include "ScopedNSSTypes.h"
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#include "SharedCertVerifier.h"
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#include "SharedSSLState.h"
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#include "mozilla/ArrayUtils.h"
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#include "mozilla/Assertions.h"
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#include "mozilla/Casting.h"
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#include "mozilla/Logging.h"
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#include "mozilla/RefPtr.h"
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#include "mozilla/Span.h"
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#include "mozilla/Telemetry.h"
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#include "mozilla/Unused.h"
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#include "nsContentUtils.h"
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#include "nsIChannel.h"
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#include "nsIHttpChannel.h"
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#include "nsIHttpChannelInternal.h"
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#include "nsIPrompt.h"
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#include "nsIProtocolProxyService.h"
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#include "nsISupportsPriority.h"
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#include "nsIStreamLoader.h"
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#include "nsITokenDialogs.h"
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#include "nsIUploadChannel.h"
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#include "nsIWebProgressListener.h"
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#include "nsNSSCertHelper.h"
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#include "nsNSSCertificate.h"
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#include "nsNSSComponent.h"
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#include "nsNSSHelper.h"
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#include "nsNSSIOLayer.h"
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#include "nsNetUtil.h"
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#include "nsProtectedAuthThread.h"
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#include "nsProxyRelease.h"
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#include "nsStringStream.h"
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#include "mozpkix/pkixtypes.h"
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#include "ssl.h"
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#include "sslproto.h"
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#include "SSLTokensCache.h"
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#include "TrustOverrideUtils.h"
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#include "TrustOverride-SymantecData.inc"
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#include "TrustOverride-AppleGoogleDigiCertData.inc"
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using namespace mozilla;
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using namespace mozilla::pkix;
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using namespace mozilla::psm;
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extern LazyLogModule gPIPNSSLog;
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static void AccumulateCipherSuite(Telemetry::HistogramID probe,
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const SSLChannelInfo& channelInfo);
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namespace {
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// Bits in bit mask for SSL_REASONS_FOR_NOT_FALSE_STARTING telemetry probe
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// These bits are numbered so that the least subtle issues have higher values.
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// This should make it easier for us to interpret the results.
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const uint32_t POSSIBLE_VERSION_DOWNGRADE = 4;
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const uint32_t POSSIBLE_CIPHER_SUITE_DOWNGRADE = 2;
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const uint32_t KEA_NOT_SUPPORTED = 1;
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} // namespace
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class OCSPRequest final : public nsIStreamLoaderObserver, public nsIRunnable {
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public:
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OCSPRequest(const nsACString& aiaLocation,
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const OriginAttributes& originAttributes,
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const uint8_t (&ocspRequest)[OCSP_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH],
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size_t ocspRequestLength, TimeDuration timeout);
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NS_DECL_THREADSAFE_ISUPPORTS
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NS_DECL_NSISTREAMLOADEROBSERVER
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NS_DECL_NSIRUNNABLE
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nsresult DispatchToMainThreadAndWait();
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nsresult GetResponse(/*out*/ Vector<uint8_t>& response);
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private:
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~OCSPRequest() = default;
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static void OnTimeout(nsITimer* timer, void* closure);
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nsresult NotifyDone(nsresult rv, MonitorAutoLock& proofOfLock);
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// mMonitor provides the memory barrier protecting these member variables.
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// What happens is the originating thread creates an OCSPRequest object with
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// the information necessary to perform an OCSP request. It sends the object
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// to the main thread and waits on the monitor for the operation to complete.
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// On the main thread, a channel is set up to perform the request. This gets
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// dispatched to necko. At the same time, a timeout timer is initialized. If
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// the necko request completes, the response data is filled out, mNotifiedDone
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// is set to true, and the monitor is notified. The original thread then wakes
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// up and continues with the results that have been filled out. If the request
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// times out, again the response data is filled out, mNotifiedDone is set to
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// true, and the monitor is notified. The first of these two events wins. That
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// is, if the timeout timer fires but the request completes shortly after, the
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// caller will see the request as having timed out.
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// When the request completes (i.e. OnStreamComplete runs), the timer will be
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// cancelled. This is how we know the closure in OnTimeout is valid. If the
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// timer fires before OnStreamComplete runs, it should be safe to not cancel
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// the request because necko has a strong reference to it.
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Monitor mMonitor;
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bool mNotifiedDone;
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nsCOMPtr<nsIStreamLoader> mLoader;
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const nsCString mAIALocation;
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const OriginAttributes mOriginAttributes;
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const mozilla::Span<const char> mPOSTData;
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const TimeDuration mTimeout;
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nsCOMPtr<nsITimer> mTimeoutTimer;
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TimeStamp mStartTime;
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nsresult mResponseResult;
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Vector<uint8_t> mResponseBytes;
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};
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NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS(OCSPRequest, nsIStreamLoaderObserver, nsIRunnable)
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OCSPRequest::OCSPRequest(const nsACString& aiaLocation,
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const OriginAttributes& originAttributes,
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const uint8_t (&ocspRequest)[OCSP_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH],
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size_t ocspRequestLength, TimeDuration timeout)
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: mMonitor("OCSPRequest.mMonitor"),
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mNotifiedDone(false),
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mLoader(nullptr),
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mAIALocation(aiaLocation),
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mOriginAttributes(originAttributes),
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mPOSTData(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(ocspRequest), ocspRequestLength),
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mTimeout(timeout),
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mTimeoutTimer(nullptr),
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mStartTime(),
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mResponseResult(NS_ERROR_FAILURE),
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mResponseBytes() {
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MOZ_ASSERT(ocspRequestLength <= OCSP_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH);
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}
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nsresult OCSPRequest::DispatchToMainThreadAndWait() {
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MOZ_ASSERT(!NS_IsMainThread());
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if (NS_IsMainThread()) {
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return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
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}
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MonitorAutoLock lock(mMonitor);
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nsresult rv = NS_DispatchToMainThread(this);
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if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
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return rv;
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}
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while (!mNotifiedDone) {
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lock.Wait();
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}
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TimeStamp endTime = TimeStamp::Now();
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// CERT_VALIDATION_HTTP_REQUEST_RESULT:
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// 0: request timed out
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// 1: request succeeded
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// 2: request failed
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// 3: internal error
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// If mStartTime was never set, we consider this an internal error.
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// Otherwise, we managed to at least send the request.
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if (mStartTime.IsNull()) {
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Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::CERT_VALIDATION_HTTP_REQUEST_RESULT, 3);
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} else if (mResponseResult == NS_ERROR_NET_TIMEOUT) {
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Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::CERT_VALIDATION_HTTP_REQUEST_RESULT, 0);
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Telemetry::AccumulateTimeDelta(
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Telemetry::CERT_VALIDATION_HTTP_REQUEST_CANCELED_TIME, mStartTime,
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endTime);
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} else if (NS_SUCCEEDED(mResponseResult)) {
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Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::CERT_VALIDATION_HTTP_REQUEST_RESULT, 1);
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Telemetry::AccumulateTimeDelta(
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Telemetry::CERT_VALIDATION_HTTP_REQUEST_SUCCEEDED_TIME, mStartTime,
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endTime);
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} else {
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Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::CERT_VALIDATION_HTTP_REQUEST_RESULT, 2);
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Telemetry::AccumulateTimeDelta(
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Telemetry::CERT_VALIDATION_HTTP_REQUEST_FAILED_TIME, mStartTime,
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endTime);
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}
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return rv;
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}
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nsresult OCSPRequest::GetResponse(/*out*/ Vector<uint8_t>& response) {
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MOZ_ASSERT(!NS_IsMainThread());
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if (NS_IsMainThread()) {
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return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
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}
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MonitorAutoLock lock(mMonitor);
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if (!mNotifiedDone) {
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return NS_ERROR_IN_PROGRESS;
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}
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if (NS_FAILED(mResponseResult)) {
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return mResponseResult;
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}
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response.clear();
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if (!response.append(mResponseBytes.begin(), mResponseBytes.length())) {
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return NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
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}
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return NS_OK;
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}
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static constexpr auto OCSP_REQUEST_MIME_TYPE = "application/ocsp-request"_ns;
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static constexpr auto OCSP_REQUEST_METHOD = "POST"_ns;
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NS_IMETHODIMP
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OCSPRequest::Run() {
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MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
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if (!NS_IsMainThread()) {
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return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
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}
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MonitorAutoLock lock(mMonitor);
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nsCOMPtr<nsIIOService> ios = do_GetIOService();
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if (!ios) {
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return NotifyDone(NS_ERROR_FAILURE, lock);
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}
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nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
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nsresult rv = NS_NewURI(getter_AddRefs(uri), mAIALocation);
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if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
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return NotifyDone(NS_ERROR_MALFORMED_URI, lock);
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}
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nsAutoCString scheme;
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rv = uri->GetScheme(scheme);
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if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
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return NotifyDone(rv, lock);
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}
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if (!scheme.LowerCaseEqualsLiteral("http")) {
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return NotifyDone(NS_ERROR_MALFORMED_URI, lock);
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}
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// See bug 1219935.
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// We should not send OCSP request if the PAC is still loading.
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nsCOMPtr<nsIProtocolProxyService> pps =
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do_GetService(NS_PROTOCOLPROXYSERVICE_CONTRACTID, &rv);
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if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
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return NotifyDone(rv, lock);
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}
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if (pps->GetIsPACLoading()) {
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return NotifyDone(NS_ERROR_FAILURE, lock);
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}
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nsCOMPtr<nsIChannel> channel;
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rv = ios->NewChannel(mAIALocation, nullptr, nullptr,
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nullptr, // aLoadingNode
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nsContentUtils::GetSystemPrincipal(),
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nullptr, // aTriggeringPrincipal
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nsILoadInfo::SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_SEC_CONTEXT_IS_NULL,
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nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_OTHER, getter_AddRefs(channel));
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if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
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return NotifyDone(rv, lock);
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}
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// Security operations scheduled through normal HTTP channels are given
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// high priority to accommodate real time OCSP transactions.
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nsCOMPtr<nsISupportsPriority> priorityChannel = do_QueryInterface(channel);
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if (priorityChannel) {
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priorityChannel->AdjustPriority(nsISupportsPriority::PRIORITY_HIGHEST);
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}
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channel->SetLoadFlags(
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nsIRequest::LOAD_ANONYMOUS | nsIRequest::LOAD_BYPASS_CACHE |
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nsIRequest::INHIBIT_CACHING | nsIChannel::LOAD_BYPASS_SERVICE_WORKER |
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nsIChannel::LOAD_BYPASS_URL_CLASSIFIER);
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nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = channel->LoadInfo();
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// Prevent HTTPS-Only Mode from upgrading the OCSP request.
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uint32_t httpsOnlyStatus = loadInfo->GetHttpsOnlyStatus();
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httpsOnlyStatus |= nsILoadInfo::HTTPS_ONLY_EXEMPT;
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loadInfo->SetHttpsOnlyStatus(httpsOnlyStatus);
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// allow deprecated HTTP request from SystemPrincipal
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loadInfo->SetAllowDeprecatedSystemRequests(true);
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// For OCSP requests, only the first party domain and private browsing id
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// aspects of origin attributes are used. This means that:
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// a) if first party isolation is enabled, OCSP requests will be isolated
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// according to the first party domain of the original https request
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// b) OCSP requests are shared across different containers as long as first
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// party isolation is not enabled and none of the containers are in private
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// browsing mode.
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if (mOriginAttributes != OriginAttributes()) {
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OriginAttributes attrs;
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attrs.mFirstPartyDomain = mOriginAttributes.mFirstPartyDomain;
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attrs.mPrivateBrowsingId = mOriginAttributes.mPrivateBrowsingId;
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rv = loadInfo->SetOriginAttributes(attrs);
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if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
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return NotifyDone(rv, lock);
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}
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}
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nsCOMPtr<nsIInputStream> uploadStream;
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rv = NS_NewByteInputStream(getter_AddRefs(uploadStream), mPOSTData,
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NS_ASSIGNMENT_COPY);
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if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
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return NotifyDone(rv, lock);
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}
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nsCOMPtr<nsIUploadChannel> uploadChannel(do_QueryInterface(channel));
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if (!uploadChannel) {
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return NotifyDone(NS_ERROR_FAILURE, lock);
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}
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rv = uploadChannel->SetUploadStream(uploadStream, OCSP_REQUEST_MIME_TYPE, -1);
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if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
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return NotifyDone(rv, lock);
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}
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// Do not use SPDY or HTTP3 for internal security operations. It could result
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// in the silent upgrade to ssl, which in turn could require an SSL
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// operation to fulfill something like an OCSP fetch, which is an
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// endless loop.
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nsCOMPtr<nsIHttpChannelInternal> internalChannel = do_QueryInterface(channel);
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if (!internalChannel) {
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return NotifyDone(rv, lock);
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}
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rv = internalChannel->SetAllowSpdy(false);
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if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
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return NotifyDone(rv, lock);
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}
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rv = internalChannel->SetAllowHttp3(false);
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if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
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return NotifyDone(rv, lock);
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}
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rv = internalChannel->SetIsOCSP(true);
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if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
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return NotifyDone(rv, lock);
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}
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nsCOMPtr<nsIHttpChannel> hchan = do_QueryInterface(channel);
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if (!hchan) {
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return NotifyDone(NS_ERROR_FAILURE, lock);
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}
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rv = hchan->SetAllowSTS(false);
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if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
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return NotifyDone(rv, lock);
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}
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rv = hchan->SetRequestMethod(OCSP_REQUEST_METHOD);
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if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
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return NotifyDone(rv, lock);
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}
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rv = NS_NewStreamLoader(getter_AddRefs(mLoader), this);
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if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
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return NotifyDone(rv, lock);
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}
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rv = NS_NewTimerWithFuncCallback(
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getter_AddRefs(mTimeoutTimer), OCSPRequest::OnTimeout, this,
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mTimeout.ToMilliseconds(), nsITimer::TYPE_ONE_SHOT, "OCSPRequest::Run");
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if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
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return NotifyDone(rv, lock);
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}
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rv = hchan->AsyncOpen(this->mLoader);
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if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
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return NotifyDone(rv, lock);
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}
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mStartTime = TimeStamp::Now();
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return NS_OK;
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}
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nsresult OCSPRequest::NotifyDone(nsresult rv, MonitorAutoLock& lock) {
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MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
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if (!NS_IsMainThread()) {
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return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
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}
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if (mNotifiedDone) {
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return mResponseResult;
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}
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mLoader = nullptr;
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mResponseResult = rv;
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if (mTimeoutTimer) {
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Unused << mTimeoutTimer->Cancel();
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}
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mNotifiedDone = true;
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lock.Notify();
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return rv;
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}
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NS_IMETHODIMP
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OCSPRequest::OnStreamComplete(nsIStreamLoader* aLoader, nsISupports* aContext,
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nsresult aStatus, uint32_t responseLen,
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const uint8_t* responseBytes) {
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MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
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if (!NS_IsMainThread()) {
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return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
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}
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MonitorAutoLock lock(mMonitor);
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nsCOMPtr<nsIRequest> req;
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nsresult rv = aLoader->GetRequest(getter_AddRefs(req));
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if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
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return NotifyDone(rv, lock);
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}
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if (NS_FAILED(aStatus)) {
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return NotifyDone(aStatus, lock);
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}
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nsCOMPtr<nsIHttpChannel> hchan = do_QueryInterface(req);
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if (!hchan) {
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return NotifyDone(NS_ERROR_FAILURE, lock);
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}
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bool requestSucceeded;
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rv = hchan->GetRequestSucceeded(&requestSucceeded);
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if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
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return NotifyDone(rv, lock);
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}
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if (!requestSucceeded) {
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return NotifyDone(NS_ERROR_FAILURE, lock);
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}
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unsigned int rcode;
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rv = hchan->GetResponseStatus(&rcode);
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if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
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return NotifyDone(rv, lock);
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}
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if (rcode != 200) {
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return NotifyDone(NS_ERROR_FAILURE, lock);
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}
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mResponseBytes.clear();
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if (!mResponseBytes.append(responseBytes, responseLen)) {
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return NotifyDone(NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY, lock);
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}
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mResponseResult = aStatus;
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return NotifyDone(NS_OK, lock);
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}
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void OCSPRequest::OnTimeout(nsITimer* timer, void* closure) {
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MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
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if (!NS_IsMainThread()) {
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return;
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}
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// We know the OCSPRequest is still alive because if the request had completed
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// (i.e. OnStreamComplete ran), the timer would have been cancelled in
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// NotifyDone.
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OCSPRequest* self = static_cast<OCSPRequest*>(closure);
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MonitorAutoLock lock(self->mMonitor);
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self->mTimeoutTimer = nullptr;
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self->NotifyDone(NS_ERROR_NET_TIMEOUT, lock);
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}
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mozilla::pkix::Result DoOCSPRequest(
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const nsCString& aiaLocation, const OriginAttributes& originAttributes,
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uint8_t (&ocspRequest)[OCSP_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH], size_t ocspRequestLength,
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TimeDuration timeout, /*out*/ Vector<uint8_t>& result) {
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MOZ_ASSERT(!NS_IsMainThread());
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if (NS_IsMainThread()) {
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return mozilla::pkix::Result::ERROR_OCSP_UNKNOWN_CERT;
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}
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if (ocspRequestLength > OCSP_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH) {
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return mozilla::pkix::Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
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}
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result.clear();
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MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
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("DoOCSPRequest to '%s'", aiaLocation.get()));
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nsCOMPtr<nsIEventTarget> sts =
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do_GetService(NS_SOCKETTRANSPORTSERVICE_CONTRACTID);
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MOZ_ASSERT(sts);
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if (!sts) {
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return mozilla::pkix::Result::FATAL_ERROR_INVALID_STATE;
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}
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bool onSTSThread;
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nsresult rv = sts->IsOnCurrentThread(&onSTSThread);
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if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
|
|
return mozilla::pkix::Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
|
|
}
|
|
MOZ_ASSERT(!onSTSThread);
|
|
if (onSTSThread) {
|
|
return mozilla::pkix::Result::FATAL_ERROR_INVALID_STATE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
RefPtr<OCSPRequest> request(new OCSPRequest(
|
|
aiaLocation, originAttributes, ocspRequest, ocspRequestLength, timeout));
|
|
rv = request->DispatchToMainThreadAndWait();
|
|
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
|
|
return mozilla::pkix::Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
|
|
}
|
|
rv = request->GetResponse(result);
|
|
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
|
|
if (rv == NS_ERROR_MALFORMED_URI) {
|
|
return mozilla::pkix::Result::ERROR_CERT_BAD_ACCESS_LOCATION;
|
|
}
|
|
return mozilla::pkix::Result::ERROR_OCSP_SERVER_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
return Success;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static char* ShowProtectedAuthPrompt(PK11SlotInfo* slot,
|
|
nsIInterfaceRequestor* ir) {
|
|
if (!NS_IsMainThread()) {
|
|
NS_ERROR("ShowProtectedAuthPrompt called off the main thread");
|
|
return nullptr;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
char* protAuthRetVal = nullptr;
|
|
|
|
// Get protected auth dialogs
|
|
nsCOMPtr<nsITokenDialogs> dialogs;
|
|
nsresult nsrv =
|
|
getNSSDialogs(getter_AddRefs(dialogs), NS_GET_IID(nsITokenDialogs),
|
|
NS_TOKENDIALOGS_CONTRACTID);
|
|
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(nsrv)) {
|
|
RefPtr<nsProtectedAuthThread> protectedAuthRunnable =
|
|
new nsProtectedAuthThread();
|
|
protectedAuthRunnable->SetParams(slot);
|
|
|
|
nsrv = dialogs->DisplayProtectedAuth(ir, protectedAuthRunnable);
|
|
|
|
// We call join on the thread,
|
|
// so we can be sure that no simultaneous access will happen.
|
|
protectedAuthRunnable->Join();
|
|
|
|
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(nsrv)) {
|
|
SECStatus rv = protectedAuthRunnable->GetResult();
|
|
switch (rv) {
|
|
case SECSuccess:
|
|
protAuthRetVal =
|
|
ToNewCString(nsDependentCString(PK11_PW_AUTHENTICATED));
|
|
break;
|
|
case SECWouldBlock:
|
|
protAuthRetVal = ToNewCString(nsDependentCString(PK11_PW_RETRY));
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
protAuthRetVal = nullptr;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return protAuthRetVal;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
class PK11PasswordPromptRunnable : public SyncRunnableBase {
|
|
public:
|
|
PK11PasswordPromptRunnable(PK11SlotInfo* slot, nsIInterfaceRequestor* ir)
|
|
: mResult(nullptr), mSlot(slot), mIR(ir) {}
|
|
virtual ~PK11PasswordPromptRunnable() = default;
|
|
|
|
char* mResult; // out
|
|
virtual void RunOnTargetThread() override;
|
|
|
|
private:
|
|
PK11SlotInfo* const mSlot; // in
|
|
nsIInterfaceRequestor* const mIR; // in
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
void PK11PasswordPromptRunnable::RunOnTargetThread() {
|
|
nsresult rv;
|
|
nsCOMPtr<nsIPrompt> prompt;
|
|
if (!mIR) {
|
|
rv = nsNSSComponent::GetNewPrompter(getter_AddRefs(prompt));
|
|
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
prompt = do_GetInterface(mIR);
|
|
MOZ_ASSERT(prompt, "Interface requestor should implement nsIPrompt");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!prompt) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (PK11_ProtectedAuthenticationPath(mSlot)) {
|
|
mResult = ShowProtectedAuthPrompt(mSlot, mIR);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
nsAutoString promptString;
|
|
if (PK11_IsInternal(mSlot)) {
|
|
rv = GetPIPNSSBundleString("CertPasswordPromptDefault", promptString);
|
|
} else {
|
|
AutoTArray<nsString, 1> formatStrings = {
|
|
NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(PK11_GetTokenName(mSlot))};
|
|
rv = PIPBundleFormatStringFromName("CertPasswordPrompt", formatStrings,
|
|
promptString);
|
|
}
|
|
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
nsString password;
|
|
bool userClickedOK = false;
|
|
rv = prompt->PromptPassword(nullptr, promptString.get(),
|
|
getter_Copies(password), &userClickedOK);
|
|
if (NS_FAILED(rv) || !userClickedOK) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
mResult = ToNewUTF8String(password);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
char* PK11PasswordPrompt(PK11SlotInfo* slot, PRBool /*retry*/, void* arg) {
|
|
RefPtr<PK11PasswordPromptRunnable> runnable(new PK11PasswordPromptRunnable(
|
|
slot, static_cast<nsIInterfaceRequestor*>(arg)));
|
|
runnable->DispatchToMainThreadAndWait();
|
|
return runnable->mResult;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
nsCString getKeaGroupName(uint32_t aKeaGroup) {
|
|
nsCString groupName;
|
|
switch (aKeaGroup) {
|
|
case ssl_grp_ec_secp256r1:
|
|
groupName = "P256"_ns;
|
|
break;
|
|
case ssl_grp_ec_secp384r1:
|
|
groupName = "P384"_ns;
|
|
break;
|
|
case ssl_grp_ec_secp521r1:
|
|
groupName = "P521"_ns;
|
|
break;
|
|
case ssl_grp_ec_curve25519:
|
|
groupName = "x25519"_ns;
|
|
break;
|
|
case ssl_grp_ffdhe_2048:
|
|
groupName = "FF 2048"_ns;
|
|
break;
|
|
case ssl_grp_ffdhe_3072:
|
|
groupName = "FF 3072"_ns;
|
|
break;
|
|
case ssl_grp_none:
|
|
groupName = "none"_ns;
|
|
break;
|
|
case ssl_grp_ffdhe_custom:
|
|
groupName = "custom"_ns;
|
|
break;
|
|
// All other groups are not enabled in Firefox. See namedGroups in
|
|
// nsNSSIOLayer.cpp.
|
|
default:
|
|
// This really shouldn't happen!
|
|
MOZ_ASSERT_UNREACHABLE("Invalid key exchange group.");
|
|
groupName = "unknown group"_ns;
|
|
}
|
|
return groupName;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
nsCString getSignatureName(uint32_t aSignatureScheme) {
|
|
nsCString signatureName;
|
|
switch (aSignatureScheme) {
|
|
case ssl_sig_none:
|
|
signatureName = "none"_ns;
|
|
break;
|
|
case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha1:
|
|
signatureName = "RSA-PKCS1-SHA1"_ns;
|
|
break;
|
|
case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha256:
|
|
signatureName = "RSA-PKCS1-SHA256"_ns;
|
|
break;
|
|
case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha384:
|
|
signatureName = "RSA-PKCS1-SHA384"_ns;
|
|
break;
|
|
case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha512:
|
|
signatureName = "RSA-PKCS1-SHA512"_ns;
|
|
break;
|
|
case ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256:
|
|
signatureName = "ECDSA-P256-SHA256"_ns;
|
|
break;
|
|
case ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384:
|
|
signatureName = "ECDSA-P384-SHA384"_ns;
|
|
break;
|
|
case ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512:
|
|
signatureName = "ECDSA-P521-SHA512"_ns;
|
|
break;
|
|
case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_sha256:
|
|
signatureName = "RSA-PSS-SHA256"_ns;
|
|
break;
|
|
case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_sha384:
|
|
signatureName = "RSA-PSS-SHA384"_ns;
|
|
break;
|
|
case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_sha512:
|
|
signatureName = "RSA-PSS-SHA512"_ns;
|
|
break;
|
|
case ssl_sig_ecdsa_sha1:
|
|
signatureName = "ECDSA-SHA1"_ns;
|
|
break;
|
|
case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha1md5:
|
|
signatureName = "RSA-PKCS1-SHA1MD5"_ns;
|
|
break;
|
|
// All other groups are not enabled in Firefox. See sEnabledSignatureSchemes
|
|
// in nsNSSIOLayer.cpp.
|
|
default:
|
|
// This really shouldn't happen!
|
|
MOZ_ASSERT_UNREACHABLE("Invalid signature scheme.");
|
|
signatureName = "unknown signature"_ns;
|
|
}
|
|
return signatureName;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// call with shutdown prevention lock held
|
|
static void PreliminaryHandshakeDone(PRFileDesc* fd) {
|
|
nsNSSSocketInfo* infoObject = (nsNSSSocketInfo*)fd->higher->secret;
|
|
if (!infoObject) return;
|
|
|
|
SSLChannelInfo channelInfo;
|
|
if (SSL_GetChannelInfo(fd, &channelInfo, sizeof(channelInfo)) == SECSuccess) {
|
|
infoObject->SetSSLVersionUsed(channelInfo.protocolVersion);
|
|
infoObject->SetEarlyDataAccepted(channelInfo.earlyDataAccepted);
|
|
infoObject->SetResumed(channelInfo.resumed);
|
|
|
|
SSLCipherSuiteInfo cipherInfo;
|
|
if (SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channelInfo.cipherSuite, &cipherInfo,
|
|
sizeof cipherInfo) == SECSuccess) {
|
|
/* Set the Status information */
|
|
infoObject->mHaveCipherSuiteAndProtocol = true;
|
|
infoObject->mCipherSuite = channelInfo.cipherSuite;
|
|
infoObject->mProtocolVersion = channelInfo.protocolVersion & 0xFF;
|
|
infoObject->mKeaGroup.Assign(getKeaGroupName(channelInfo.keaGroup));
|
|
infoObject->mSignatureSchemeName.Assign(
|
|
getSignatureName(channelInfo.signatureScheme));
|
|
infoObject->SetKEAUsed(channelInfo.keaType);
|
|
infoObject->SetKEAKeyBits(channelInfo.keaKeyBits);
|
|
infoObject->SetMACAlgorithmUsed(cipherInfo.macAlgorithm);
|
|
infoObject->mIsDelegatedCredential = channelInfo.peerDelegCred;
|
|
infoObject->mIsAcceptedEch = channelInfo.echAccepted;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Don't update NPN details on renegotiation.
|
|
if (infoObject->IsPreliminaryHandshakeDone()) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Get the NPN value.
|
|
SSLNextProtoState state;
|
|
unsigned char npnbuf[256];
|
|
unsigned int npnlen;
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_GetNextProto(fd, &state, npnbuf, &npnlen,
|
|
AssertedCast<unsigned int>(ArrayLength(npnbuf))) ==
|
|
SECSuccess) {
|
|
if (state == SSL_NEXT_PROTO_NEGOTIATED ||
|
|
state == SSL_NEXT_PROTO_SELECTED) {
|
|
infoObject->SetNegotiatedNPN(BitwiseCast<char*, unsigned char*>(npnbuf),
|
|
npnlen);
|
|
} else {
|
|
infoObject->SetNegotiatedNPN(nullptr, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
mozilla::Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::SSL_NPN_TYPE, state);
|
|
} else {
|
|
infoObject->SetNegotiatedNPN(nullptr, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
infoObject->SetPreliminaryHandshakeDone();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SECStatus CanFalseStartCallback(PRFileDesc* fd, void* client_data,
|
|
PRBool* canFalseStart) {
|
|
*canFalseStart = false;
|
|
|
|
nsNSSSocketInfo* infoObject = (nsNSSSocketInfo*)fd->higher->secret;
|
|
if (!infoObject) {
|
|
PR_SetError(PR_INVALID_STATE_ERROR, 0);
|
|
return SECFailure;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
infoObject->SetFalseStartCallbackCalled();
|
|
|
|
PreliminaryHandshakeDone(fd);
|
|
|
|
uint32_t reasonsForNotFalseStarting = 0;
|
|
|
|
SSLChannelInfo channelInfo;
|
|
if (SSL_GetChannelInfo(fd, &channelInfo, sizeof(channelInfo)) != SECSuccess) {
|
|
return SECSuccess;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SSLCipherSuiteInfo cipherInfo;
|
|
if (SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channelInfo.cipherSuite, &cipherInfo,
|
|
sizeof(cipherInfo)) != SECSuccess) {
|
|
MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
|
|
("CanFalseStartCallback [%p] failed - "
|
|
" KEA %d\n",
|
|
fd, static_cast<int32_t>(channelInfo.keaType)));
|
|
return SECSuccess;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Prevent version downgrade attacks from TLS 1.2, and avoid False Start for
|
|
// TLS 1.3 and later. See Bug 861310 for all the details as to why.
|
|
if (channelInfo.protocolVersion != SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) {
|
|
MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
|
|
("CanFalseStartCallback [%p] failed - "
|
|
"SSL Version must be TLS 1.2, was %x\n",
|
|
fd, static_cast<int32_t>(channelInfo.protocolVersion)));
|
|
reasonsForNotFalseStarting |= POSSIBLE_VERSION_DOWNGRADE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// See bug 952863 for why ECDHE is allowed, but DHE (and RSA) are not.
|
|
if (channelInfo.keaType != ssl_kea_ecdh) {
|
|
MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
|
|
("CanFalseStartCallback [%p] failed - "
|
|
"unsupported KEA %d\n",
|
|
fd, static_cast<int32_t>(channelInfo.keaType)));
|
|
reasonsForNotFalseStarting |= KEA_NOT_SUPPORTED;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Prevent downgrade attacks on the symmetric cipher. We do not allow CBC
|
|
// mode due to BEAST, POODLE, and other attacks on the MAC-then-Encrypt
|
|
// design. See bug 1109766 for more details.
|
|
if (cipherInfo.macAlgorithm != ssl_mac_aead) {
|
|
MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
|
|
("CanFalseStartCallback [%p] failed - non-AEAD cipher used, %d, "
|
|
"is not supported with False Start.\n",
|
|
fd, static_cast<int32_t>(cipherInfo.symCipher)));
|
|
reasonsForNotFalseStarting |= POSSIBLE_CIPHER_SUITE_DOWNGRADE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// XXX: An attacker can choose which protocols are advertised in the
|
|
// NPN extension. TODO(Bug 861311): We should restrict the ability
|
|
// of an attacker leverage this capability by restricting false start
|
|
// to the same protocol we previously saw for the server, after the
|
|
// first successful connection to the server.
|
|
|
|
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::SSL_REASONS_FOR_NOT_FALSE_STARTING,
|
|
reasonsForNotFalseStarting);
|
|
|
|
if (reasonsForNotFalseStarting == 0) {
|
|
*canFalseStart = PR_TRUE;
|
|
infoObject->SetFalseStarted();
|
|
infoObject->NoteTimeUntilReady();
|
|
MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
|
|
("CanFalseStartCallback [%p] ok\n", fd));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return SECSuccess;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void AccumulateNonECCKeySize(Telemetry::HistogramID probe,
|
|
uint32_t bits) {
|
|
unsigned int value = bits < 512 ? 1
|
|
: bits == 512 ? 2
|
|
: bits < 768 ? 3
|
|
: bits == 768 ? 4
|
|
: bits < 1024 ? 5
|
|
: bits == 1024 ? 6
|
|
: bits < 1280 ? 7
|
|
: bits == 1280 ? 8
|
|
: bits < 1536 ? 9
|
|
: bits == 1536 ? 10
|
|
: bits < 2048 ? 11
|
|
: bits == 2048 ? 12
|
|
: bits < 3072 ? 13
|
|
: bits == 3072 ? 14
|
|
: bits < 4096 ? 15
|
|
: bits == 4096 ? 16
|
|
: bits < 8192 ? 17
|
|
: bits == 8192 ? 18
|
|
: bits < 16384 ? 19
|
|
: bits == 16384 ? 20
|
|
: 0;
|
|
Telemetry::Accumulate(probe, value);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// XXX: This attempts to map a bit count to an ECC named curve identifier. In
|
|
// the vast majority of situations, we only have the Suite B curves available.
|
|
// In that case, this mapping works fine. If we were to have more curves
|
|
// available, the mapping would be ambiguous since there could be multiple
|
|
// named curves for a given size (e.g. secp256k1 vs. secp256r1). We punt on
|
|
// that for now. See also NSS bug 323674.
|
|
static void AccumulateECCCurve(Telemetry::HistogramID probe, uint32_t bits) {
|
|
unsigned int value = bits == 255 ? 29 // Curve25519
|
|
: bits == 256 ? 23 // P-256
|
|
: bits == 384 ? 24 // P-384
|
|
: bits == 521 ? 25 // P-521
|
|
: 0; // Unknown
|
|
Telemetry::Accumulate(probe, value);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void AccumulateCipherSuite(Telemetry::HistogramID probe,
|
|
const SSLChannelInfo& channelInfo) {
|
|
uint32_t value;
|
|
switch (channelInfo.cipherSuite) {
|
|
// ECDHE key exchange
|
|
case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:
|
|
value = 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:
|
|
value = 2;
|
|
break;
|
|
case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA:
|
|
value = 3;
|
|
break;
|
|
case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA:
|
|
value = 4;
|
|
break;
|
|
case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA:
|
|
value = 5;
|
|
break;
|
|
case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA:
|
|
value = 6;
|
|
break;
|
|
case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA:
|
|
value = 7;
|
|
break;
|
|
case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA:
|
|
value = 10;
|
|
break;
|
|
case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256:
|
|
value = 11;
|
|
break;
|
|
case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256:
|
|
value = 12;
|
|
break;
|
|
case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:
|
|
value = 13;
|
|
break;
|
|
case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:
|
|
value = 14;
|
|
break;
|
|
// DHE key exchange
|
|
case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA:
|
|
value = 21;
|
|
break;
|
|
case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA:
|
|
value = 22;
|
|
break;
|
|
case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA:
|
|
value = 23;
|
|
break;
|
|
case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA:
|
|
value = 24;
|
|
break;
|
|
case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA:
|
|
value = 25;
|
|
break;
|
|
case TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA:
|
|
value = 26;
|
|
break;
|
|
case TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA:
|
|
value = 27;
|
|
break;
|
|
case TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA:
|
|
value = 28;
|
|
break;
|
|
case TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA:
|
|
value = 29;
|
|
break;
|
|
case TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA:
|
|
value = 30;
|
|
break;
|
|
// ECDH key exchange
|
|
case TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA:
|
|
value = 41;
|
|
break;
|
|
case TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA:
|
|
value = 42;
|
|
break;
|
|
case TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA:
|
|
value = 43;
|
|
break;
|
|
case TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA:
|
|
value = 44;
|
|
break;
|
|
case TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA:
|
|
value = 45;
|
|
break;
|
|
case TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA:
|
|
value = 46;
|
|
break;
|
|
// RSA key exchange
|
|
case TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA:
|
|
value = 61;
|
|
break;
|
|
case TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA:
|
|
value = 62;
|
|
break;
|
|
case TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA:
|
|
value = 63;
|
|
break;
|
|
case TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA:
|
|
value = 64;
|
|
break;
|
|
case SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA:
|
|
value = 65;
|
|
break;
|
|
case TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA:
|
|
value = 66;
|
|
break;
|
|
case TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA:
|
|
value = 67;
|
|
break;
|
|
case TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:
|
|
value = 68;
|
|
break;
|
|
case TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:
|
|
value = 69;
|
|
break;
|
|
// TLS 1.3 PSK resumption
|
|
case TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:
|
|
value = 70;
|
|
break;
|
|
case TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256:
|
|
value = 71;
|
|
break;
|
|
case TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:
|
|
value = 72;
|
|
break;
|
|
// unknown
|
|
default:
|
|
value = 0;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
MOZ_ASSERT(value != 0);
|
|
Telemetry::Accumulate(probe, value);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// In the case of session resumption, the AuthCertificate hook has been bypassed
|
|
// (because we've previously successfully connected to our peer). That being the
|
|
// case, we unfortunately don't know what the verified certificate chain was, if
|
|
// the peer's server certificate verified as extended validation, or what its CT
|
|
// status is (if enabled). To address this, we attempt to build a certificate
|
|
// chain here using as much of the original context as possible (e.g. stapled
|
|
// OCSP responses, SCTs, the hostname, the first party domain, etc.). Note that
|
|
// because we are on the socket thread, this must not cause any network
|
|
// requests, hence the use of FLAG_LOCAL_ONLY.
|
|
static void RebuildVerifiedCertificateInformation(PRFileDesc* fd,
|
|
nsNSSSocketInfo* infoObject) {
|
|
MOZ_ASSERT(fd);
|
|
MOZ_ASSERT(infoObject);
|
|
|
|
if (!fd || !infoObject) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
UniqueCERTCertificate cert(SSL_PeerCertificate(fd));
|
|
MOZ_ASSERT(cert, "SSL_PeerCertificate failed in TLS handshake callback?");
|
|
if (!cert) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
Maybe<nsTArray<nsTArray<uint8_t>>> maybePeerCertsBytes;
|
|
UniqueCERTCertList peerCertChain(SSL_PeerCertificateChain(fd));
|
|
if (!peerCertChain) {
|
|
MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
|
|
("RebuildVerifiedCertificateInformation: failed to get peer "
|
|
"certificate chain"));
|
|
} else {
|
|
nsTArray<nsTArray<uint8_t>> peerCertsBytes;
|
|
for (CERTCertListNode* n = CERT_LIST_HEAD(peerCertChain);
|
|
!CERT_LIST_END(n, peerCertChain); n = CERT_LIST_NEXT(n)) {
|
|
// Don't include the end-entity certificate.
|
|
if (n == CERT_LIST_HEAD(peerCertChain)) {
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
nsTArray<uint8_t> certBytes;
|
|
certBytes.AppendElements(n->cert->derCert.data, n->cert->derCert.len);
|
|
peerCertsBytes.AppendElement(std::move(certBytes));
|
|
}
|
|
maybePeerCertsBytes.emplace(std::move(peerCertsBytes));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
RefPtr<SharedCertVerifier> certVerifier(GetDefaultCertVerifier());
|
|
MOZ_ASSERT(certVerifier,
|
|
"Certificate verifier uninitialized in TLS handshake callback?");
|
|
if (!certVerifier) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// We don't own these pointers.
|
|
const SECItemArray* stapledOCSPResponses = SSL_PeerStapledOCSPResponses(fd);
|
|
Maybe<nsTArray<uint8_t>> stapledOCSPResponse;
|
|
// we currently only support single stapled responses
|
|
if (stapledOCSPResponses && stapledOCSPResponses->len == 1) {
|
|
stapledOCSPResponse.emplace();
|
|
stapledOCSPResponse->SetCapacity(stapledOCSPResponses->items[0].len);
|
|
stapledOCSPResponse->AppendElements(stapledOCSPResponses->items[0].data,
|
|
stapledOCSPResponses->items[0].len);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
Maybe<nsTArray<uint8_t>> sctsFromTLSExtension;
|
|
const SECItem* sctsFromTLSExtensionSECItem = SSL_PeerSignedCertTimestamps(fd);
|
|
if (sctsFromTLSExtensionSECItem) {
|
|
sctsFromTLSExtension.emplace();
|
|
sctsFromTLSExtension->SetCapacity(sctsFromTLSExtensionSECItem->len);
|
|
sctsFromTLSExtension->AppendElements(sctsFromTLSExtensionSECItem->data,
|
|
sctsFromTLSExtensionSECItem->len);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int flags = mozilla::psm::CertVerifier::FLAG_LOCAL_ONLY;
|
|
if (!infoObject->SharedState().IsOCSPStaplingEnabled() ||
|
|
!infoObject->SharedState().IsOCSPMustStapleEnabled()) {
|
|
flags |= CertVerifier::FLAG_TLS_IGNORE_STATUS_REQUEST;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
EVStatus evStatus;
|
|
CertificateTransparencyInfo certificateTransparencyInfo;
|
|
nsTArray<nsTArray<uint8_t>> builtChainCertBytes;
|
|
nsTArray<uint8_t> certBytes(cert->derCert.data, cert->derCert.len);
|
|
bool isBuiltCertChainRootBuiltInRoot = false;
|
|
mozilla::pkix::Result rv = certVerifier->VerifySSLServerCert(
|
|
certBytes, mozilla::pkix::Now(), infoObject, infoObject->GetHostName(),
|
|
builtChainCertBytes, flags, maybePeerCertsBytes, stapledOCSPResponse,
|
|
sctsFromTLSExtension, Nothing(), infoObject->GetOriginAttributes(),
|
|
&evStatus,
|
|
nullptr, // OCSP stapling telemetry
|
|
nullptr, // key size telemetry
|
|
nullptr, // SHA-1 telemetry
|
|
nullptr, // pinning telemetry
|
|
&certificateTransparencyInfo, &isBuiltCertChainRootBuiltInRoot);
|
|
|
|
if (rv != Success) {
|
|
MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
|
|
("HandshakeCallback: couldn't rebuild verified certificate info"));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
RefPtr<nsNSSCertificate> nssc(nsNSSCertificate::Create(cert.get()));
|
|
if (rv == Success && evStatus == EVStatus::EV) {
|
|
MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
|
|
("HandshakeCallback using NEW cert %p (is EV)", nssc.get()));
|
|
infoObject->SetServerCert(nssc, EVStatus::EV);
|
|
} else {
|
|
MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
|
|
("HandshakeCallback using NEW cert %p (is not EV)", nssc.get()));
|
|
infoObject->SetServerCert(nssc, EVStatus::NotEV);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (rv == Success) {
|
|
uint16_t status =
|
|
TransportSecurityInfo::ConvertCertificateTransparencyInfoToStatus(
|
|
certificateTransparencyInfo);
|
|
infoObject->SetCertificateTransparencyStatus(status);
|
|
infoObject->SetSucceededCertChain(std::move(builtChainCertBytes));
|
|
infoObject->SetIsBuiltCertChainRootBuiltInRoot(
|
|
isBuiltCertChainRootBuiltInRoot);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void HandshakeCallback(PRFileDesc* fd, void* client_data) {
|
|
SECStatus rv;
|
|
|
|
nsNSSSocketInfo* infoObject = (nsNSSSocketInfo*)fd->higher->secret;
|
|
|
|
// Do the bookkeeping that needs to be done after the
|
|
// server's ServerHello...ServerHelloDone have been processed, but that
|
|
// doesn't need the handshake to be completed.
|
|
PreliminaryHandshakeDone(fd);
|
|
|
|
nsSSLIOLayerHelpers& ioLayerHelpers =
|
|
infoObject->SharedState().IOLayerHelpers();
|
|
|
|
SSLVersionRange versions(infoObject->GetTLSVersionRange());
|
|
|
|
MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
|
|
("[%p] HandshakeCallback: succeeded using TLS version range "
|
|
"(0x%04x,0x%04x)\n",
|
|
fd, static_cast<unsigned int>(versions.min),
|
|
static_cast<unsigned int>(versions.max)));
|
|
|
|
// If the handshake completed, then we know the site is TLS tolerant
|
|
ioLayerHelpers.rememberTolerantAtVersion(infoObject->GetHostName(),
|
|
infoObject->GetPort(), versions.max);
|
|
|
|
SSLChannelInfo channelInfo;
|
|
rv = SSL_GetChannelInfo(fd, &channelInfo, sizeof(channelInfo));
|
|
MOZ_ASSERT(rv == SECSuccess);
|
|
if (rv == SECSuccess) {
|
|
// Get the protocol version for telemetry
|
|
// 1=tls1, 2=tls1.1, 3=tls1.2
|
|
unsigned int versionEnum = channelInfo.protocolVersion & 0xFF;
|
|
MOZ_ASSERT(versionEnum > 0);
|
|
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::SSL_HANDSHAKE_VERSION, versionEnum);
|
|
AccumulateCipherSuite(infoObject->IsFullHandshake()
|
|
? Telemetry::SSL_CIPHER_SUITE_FULL
|
|
: Telemetry::SSL_CIPHER_SUITE_RESUMED,
|
|
channelInfo);
|
|
|
|
SSLCipherSuiteInfo cipherInfo;
|
|
rv = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channelInfo.cipherSuite, &cipherInfo,
|
|
sizeof cipherInfo);
|
|
MOZ_ASSERT(rv == SECSuccess);
|
|
if (rv == SECSuccess) {
|
|
// keyExchange null=0, rsa=1, dh=2, fortezza=3, ecdh=4
|
|
Telemetry::Accumulate(infoObject->IsFullHandshake()
|
|
? Telemetry::SSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_ALGORITHM_FULL
|
|
: Telemetry::SSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_ALGORITHM_RESUMED,
|
|
channelInfo.keaType);
|
|
|
|
MOZ_ASSERT(infoObject->GetKEAUsed() == channelInfo.keaType);
|
|
|
|
if (infoObject->IsFullHandshake()) {
|
|
switch (channelInfo.keaType) {
|
|
case ssl_kea_rsa:
|
|
AccumulateNonECCKeySize(Telemetry::SSL_KEA_RSA_KEY_SIZE_FULL,
|
|
channelInfo.keaKeyBits);
|
|
break;
|
|
case ssl_kea_dh:
|
|
AccumulateNonECCKeySize(Telemetry::SSL_KEA_DHE_KEY_SIZE_FULL,
|
|
channelInfo.keaKeyBits);
|
|
break;
|
|
case ssl_kea_ecdh:
|
|
AccumulateECCCurve(Telemetry::SSL_KEA_ECDHE_CURVE_FULL,
|
|
channelInfo.keaKeyBits);
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
MOZ_CRASH("impossible KEA");
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::SSL_AUTH_ALGORITHM_FULL,
|
|
channelInfo.authType);
|
|
|
|
// RSA key exchange doesn't use a signature for auth.
|
|
if (channelInfo.keaType != ssl_kea_rsa) {
|
|
switch (channelInfo.authType) {
|
|
case ssl_auth_rsa:
|
|
case ssl_auth_rsa_sign:
|
|
AccumulateNonECCKeySize(Telemetry::SSL_AUTH_RSA_KEY_SIZE_FULL,
|
|
channelInfo.authKeyBits);
|
|
break;
|
|
case ssl_auth_ecdsa:
|
|
AccumulateECCCurve(Telemetry::SSL_AUTH_ECDSA_CURVE_FULL,
|
|
channelInfo.authKeyBits);
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
MOZ_CRASH("impossible auth algorithm");
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
Telemetry::Accumulate(infoObject->IsFullHandshake()
|
|
? Telemetry::SSL_SYMMETRIC_CIPHER_FULL
|
|
: Telemetry::SSL_SYMMETRIC_CIPHER_RESUMED,
|
|
cipherInfo.symCipher);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
PRBool siteSupportsSafeRenego;
|
|
if (channelInfo.protocolVersion != SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
|
|
rv = SSL_HandshakeNegotiatedExtension(fd, ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn,
|
|
&siteSupportsSafeRenego);
|
|
MOZ_ASSERT(rv == SECSuccess);
|
|
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
|
|
siteSupportsSafeRenego = false;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
// TLS 1.3 dropped support for renegotiation.
|
|
siteSupportsSafeRenego = true;
|
|
}
|
|
bool renegotiationUnsafe = !siteSupportsSafeRenego &&
|
|
ioLayerHelpers.treatUnsafeNegotiationAsBroken();
|
|
|
|
bool deprecatedTlsVer =
|
|
(channelInfo.protocolVersion < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2);
|
|
RememberCertErrorsTable::GetInstance().LookupCertErrorBits(infoObject);
|
|
|
|
uint32_t state;
|
|
if (renegotiationUnsafe || deprecatedTlsVer) {
|
|
state = nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_IS_BROKEN;
|
|
} else {
|
|
state = nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_IS_SECURE;
|
|
SSLVersionRange defVersion;
|
|
rv = SSL_VersionRangeGetDefault(ssl_variant_stream, &defVersion);
|
|
if (rv == SECSuccess && versions.max >= defVersion.max) {
|
|
// we know this site no longer requires a version fallback
|
|
ioLayerHelpers.removeInsecureFallbackSite(infoObject->GetHostName(),
|
|
infoObject->GetPort());
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (infoObject->HasServerCert()) {
|
|
MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
|
|
("HandshakeCallback KEEPING existing cert\n"));
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (StaticPrefs::network_ssl_tokens_cache_enabled()) {
|
|
infoObject->RebuildCertificateInfoFromSSLTokenCache();
|
|
} else {
|
|
RebuildVerifiedCertificateInformation(fd, infoObject);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool domainMismatch;
|
|
bool untrusted;
|
|
bool notValidAtThisTime;
|
|
// These all return NS_OK, so don't even bother checking the return values.
|
|
Unused << infoObject->GetIsDomainMismatch(&domainMismatch);
|
|
Unused << infoObject->GetIsUntrusted(&untrusted);
|
|
Unused << infoObject->GetIsNotValidAtThisTime(¬ValidAtThisTime);
|
|
// If we're here, the TLS handshake has succeeded. Thus if any of these
|
|
// booleans are true, the user has added an override for a certificate error.
|
|
if (domainMismatch || untrusted || notValidAtThisTime) {
|
|
state |= nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_CERT_USER_OVERRIDDEN;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
infoObject->SetSecurityState(state);
|
|
|
|
// XXX Bug 883674: We shouldn't be formatting messages here in PSM; instead,
|
|
// we should set a flag on the channel that higher (UI) level code can check
|
|
// to log the warning. In particular, these warnings should go to the web
|
|
// console instead of to the error console. Also, the warning is not
|
|
// localized.
|
|
if (!siteSupportsSafeRenego) {
|
|
NS_ConvertASCIItoUTF16 msg(infoObject->GetHostName());
|
|
msg.AppendLiteral(" : server does not support RFC 5746, see CVE-2009-3555");
|
|
|
|
nsContentUtils::LogSimpleConsoleError(
|
|
msg, "SSL", !!infoObject->GetOriginAttributes().mPrivateBrowsingId,
|
|
true /* from chrome context */);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
infoObject->NoteTimeUntilReady();
|
|
infoObject->SetHandshakeCompleted();
|
|
}
|