Files
tubestation/addon-sdk/source/lib/sdk/content/sandbox.js
Bobby Holley 3b2edd990a Bug 1015396 - Get rid of apiSandbox. r=irakli
Currently, Jetpack uses two sandboxes for each content script - one for the
content script itself, and another for SDK machinery. And we end up getting Xrays
between the sandboxes, even though they're same-origin (generally with an nsEP)
because Jetpack sandboxes use |wantXrays: true| to get same-origin Xrays.

Object Xrays cause all sorts of communication problems between the sandboxes.
Irakli says we don't actually need the separate sandbox anymore since we've
removed the proxy layer, so let's just get rid of it.
2014-05-30 15:11:06 -07:00

406 lines
14 KiB
JavaScript

/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
'use strict';
module.metadata = {
'stability': 'unstable'
};
const { Class } = require('../core/heritage');
const { EventTarget } = require('../event/target');
const { on, off, emit } = require('../event/core');
const { requiresAddonGlobal } = require('./utils');
const { delay: async } = require('../lang/functional');
const { Ci, Cu, Cc } = require('chrome');
const timer = require('../timers');
const { URL } = require('../url');
const { sandbox, evaluate, load } = require('../loader/sandbox');
const { merge } = require('../util/object');
const { getTabForContentWindow } = require('../tabs/utils');
const { getInnerId } = require('../window/utils');
const { PlainTextConsole } = require('../console/plain-text');
// WeakMap of sandboxes so we can access private values
const sandboxes = new WeakMap();
/* Trick the linker in order to ensure shipping these files in the XPI.
require('./content-worker.js');
Then, retrieve URL of these files in the XPI:
*/
let prefix = module.uri.split('sandbox.js')[0];
const CONTENT_WORKER_URL = prefix + 'content-worker.js';
const metadata = require('@loader/options').metadata;
// Fetch additional list of domains to authorize access to for each content
// script. It is stored in manifest `metadata` field which contains
// package.json data. This list is originaly defined by authors in
// `permissions` attribute of their package.json addon file.
const permissions = (metadata && metadata['permissions']) || {};
const EXPANDED_PRINCIPALS = permissions['cross-domain-content'] || [];
const waiveSecurityMembrane = !!permissions['unsafe-content-script'];
const nsIScriptSecurityManager = Ci.nsIScriptSecurityManager;
const secMan = Cc["@mozilla.org/scriptsecuritymanager;1"].
getService(Ci.nsIScriptSecurityManager);
const JS_VERSION = '1.8';
const WorkerSandbox = Class({
implements: [ EventTarget ],
/**
* Emit a message to the worker content sandbox
*/
emit: function emit(type, ...args) {
// JSON.stringify is buggy with cross-sandbox values,
// it may return "{}" on functions. Use a replacer to match them correctly.
let replacer = (k, v) =>
typeof(v) === "function"
? (type === "console" ? Function.toString.call(v) : void(0))
: v;
// Ensure having an asynchronous behavior
async(() =>
emitToContent(this, JSON.stringify([type, ...args], replacer))
);
},
/**
* Synchronous version of `emit`.
* /!\ Should only be used when it is strictly mandatory /!\
* Doesn't ensure passing only JSON values.
* Mainly used by context-menu in order to avoid breaking it.
*/
emitSync: function emitSync(...args) {
return emitToContent(this, args);
},
/**
* Tells if content script has at least one listener registered for one event,
* through `self.on('xxx', ...)`.
* /!\ Shouldn't be used. Implemented to avoid breaking context-menu API.
*/
hasListenerFor: function hasListenerFor(name) {
return modelFor(this).hasListenerFor(name);
},
/**
* Configures sandbox and loads content scripts into it.
* @param {Worker} worker
* content worker
*/
initialize: function WorkerSandbox(worker, window) {
let model = {};
sandboxes.set(this, model);
model.worker = worker;
// We receive a wrapped window, that may be an xraywrapper if it's content
let proto = window;
// TODO necessary?
// Ensure that `emit` has always the right `this`
this.emit = this.emit.bind(this);
this.emitSync = this.emitSync.bind(this);
// Use expanded principal for content-script if the content is a
// regular web content for better isolation.
// (This behavior can be turned off for now with the unsafe-content-script
// flag to give addon developers time for making the necessary changes)
// But prevent it when the Worker isn't used for a content script but for
// injecting `addon` object into a Panel, Widget, ... scope.
// That's because:
// 1/ It is useless to use multiple domains as the worker is only used
// to communicate with the addon,
// 2/ By using it it would prevent the document to have access to any JS
// value of the worker. As JS values coming from multiple domain principals
// can't be accessed by 'mono-principals' (principal with only one domain).
// Even if this principal is for a domain that is specified in the multiple
// domain principal.
let principals = window;
let wantGlobalProperties = [];
let isSystemPrincipal = secMan.isSystemPrincipal(
window.document.nodePrincipal);
if (!isSystemPrincipal && !requiresAddonGlobal(worker)) {
if (EXPANDED_PRINCIPALS.length > 0) {
// We have to replace XHR constructor of the content document
// with a custom cross origin one, automagically added by platform code:
delete proto.XMLHttpRequest;
wantGlobalProperties.push('XMLHttpRequest');
}
if (!waiveSecurityMembrane)
principals = EXPANDED_PRINCIPALS.concat(window);
}
// Create the sandbox and bind it to window in order for content scripts to
// have access to all standard globals (window, document, ...)
let content = sandbox(principals, {
sandboxPrototype: proto,
wantXrays: true,
wantGlobalProperties: wantGlobalProperties,
wantExportHelpers: true,
sameZoneAs: window,
metadata: {
SDKContentScript: true,
'inner-window-id': getInnerId(window)
}
});
model.sandbox = content;
// We have to ensure that window.top and window.parent are the exact same
// object than window object, i.e. the sandbox global object. But not
// always, in case of iframes, top and parent are another window object.
let top = window.top === window ? content : content.top;
let parent = window.parent === window ? content : content.parent;
merge(content, {
// We need 'this === window === top' to be true in toplevel scope:
get window() content,
get top() top,
get parent() parent,
// Use the Greasemonkey naming convention to provide access to the
// unwrapped window object so the content script can access document
// JavaScript values.
// NOTE: this functionality is experimental and may change or go away
// at any time!
get unsafeWindow() window.wrappedJSObject
});
// Load trusted code that will inject content script API.
let ContentWorker = load(content, CONTENT_WORKER_URL);
// prepare a clean `self.options`
let options = 'contentScriptOptions' in worker ?
JSON.stringify(worker.contentScriptOptions) :
undefined;
// Then call `inject` method and communicate with this script
// by trading two methods that allow to send events to the other side:
// - `onEvent` called by content script
// - `result.emitToContent` called by addon script
// Bug 758203: We have to explicitely define `__exposedProps__` in order
// to allow access to these chrome object attributes from this sandbox with
// content priviledges
// https://developer.mozilla.org/en/XPConnect_wrappers#Other_security_wrappers
let onEvent = onContentEvent.bind(null, this);
let chromeAPI = createChromeAPI();
let result = Cu.waiveXrays(ContentWorker).inject(content, chromeAPI, onEvent, options);
// Merge `emitToContent` and `hasListenerFor` into our private
// model of the WorkerSandbox so we can communicate with content
// script
merge(model, result);
let console = new PlainTextConsole(null, getInnerId(window));
// Handle messages send by this script:
setListeners(this, console);
// Inject `addon` global into target document if document is trusted,
// `addon` in document is equivalent to `self` in content script.
if (requiresAddonGlobal(worker)) {
Object.defineProperty(getUnsafeWindow(window), 'addon', {
value: content.self
}
);
}
// Inject our `console` into target document if worker doesn't have a tab
// (e.g Panel, PageWorker, Widget).
// `worker.tab` can't be used because bug 804935.
if (!getTabForContentWindow(window)) {
let win = getUnsafeWindow(window);
// export our chrome console to content window, as described here:
// https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Components.utils.createObjectIn
let con = Cu.createObjectIn(win);
let genPropDesc = function genPropDesc(fun) {
return { enumerable: true, configurable: true, writable: true,
value: console[fun] };
}
const properties = {
log: genPropDesc('log'),
info: genPropDesc('info'),
warn: genPropDesc('warn'),
error: genPropDesc('error'),
debug: genPropDesc('debug'),
trace: genPropDesc('trace'),
dir: genPropDesc('dir'),
group: genPropDesc('group'),
groupCollapsed: genPropDesc('groupCollapsed'),
groupEnd: genPropDesc('groupEnd'),
time: genPropDesc('time'),
timeEnd: genPropDesc('timeEnd'),
profile: genPropDesc('profile'),
profileEnd: genPropDesc('profileEnd'),
__noSuchMethod__: { enumerable: true, configurable: true, writable: true,
value: function() {} }
};
Object.defineProperties(con, properties);
Cu.makeObjectPropsNormal(con);
win.console = con;
};
// The order of `contentScriptFile` and `contentScript` evaluation is
// intentional, so programs can load libraries like jQuery from script URLs
// and use them in scripts.
let contentScriptFile = ('contentScriptFile' in worker) ? worker.contentScriptFile
: null,
contentScript = ('contentScript' in worker) ? worker.contentScript : null;
if (contentScriptFile)
importScripts.apply(null, [this].concat(contentScriptFile));
if (contentScript) {
evaluateIn(
this,
Array.isArray(contentScript) ? contentScript.join(';\n') : contentScript
);
}
},
destroy: function destroy(reason) {
if (typeof reason != 'string')
reason = '';
this.emitSync('event', 'detach', reason);
let model = modelFor(this);
model.sandbox = null
model.worker = null;
},
});
exports.WorkerSandbox = WorkerSandbox;
/**
* Imports scripts to the sandbox by reading files under urls and
* evaluating its source. If exception occurs during evaluation
* `'error'` event is emitted on the worker.
* This is actually an analog to the `importScript` method in web
* workers but in our case it's not exposed even though content
* scripts may be able to do it synchronously since IO operation
* takes place in the UI process.
*/
function importScripts (workerSandbox, ...urls) {
let { worker, sandbox } = modelFor(workerSandbox);
for (let i in urls) {
let contentScriptFile = urls[i];
try {
let uri = URL(contentScriptFile);
if (uri.scheme === 'resource')
load(sandbox, String(uri));
else
throw Error('Unsupported `contentScriptFile` url: ' + String(uri));
}
catch(e) {
emit(worker, 'error', e);
}
}
}
function setListeners (workerSandbox, console) {
let { worker } = modelFor(workerSandbox);
// console.xxx calls
workerSandbox.on('console', function consoleListener (kind, ...args) {
console[kind].apply(console, args);
});
// self.postMessage calls
workerSandbox.on('message', function postMessage(data) {
// destroyed?
if (worker)
emit(worker, 'message', data);
});
// self.port.emit calls
workerSandbox.on('event', function portEmit (...eventArgs) {
// If not destroyed, emit event information to worker
// `eventArgs` has the event name as first element,
// and remaining elements are additional arguments to pass
if (worker)
emit.apply(null, [worker.port].concat(eventArgs));
});
// unwrap, recreate and propagate async Errors thrown from content-script
workerSandbox.on('error', function onError({instanceOfError, value}) {
if (worker) {
let error = value;
if (instanceOfError) {
error = new Error(value.message, value.fileName, value.lineNumber);
error.stack = value.stack;
error.name = value.name;
}
emit(worker, 'error', error);
}
});
}
/**
* Evaluates code in the sandbox.
* @param {String} code
* JavaScript source to evaluate.
* @param {String} [filename='javascript:' + code]
* Name of the file
*/
function evaluateIn (workerSandbox, code, filename) {
let { worker, sandbox } = modelFor(workerSandbox);
try {
evaluate(sandbox, code, filename || 'javascript:' + code);
}
catch(e) {
emit(worker, 'error', e);
}
}
/**
* Method called by the worker sandbox when it needs to send a message
*/
function onContentEvent (workerSandbox, args) {
// As `emit`, we ensure having an asynchronous behavior
async(function () {
// We emit event to chrome/addon listeners
emit.apply(null, [workerSandbox].concat(JSON.parse(args)));
});
}
function modelFor (workerSandbox) {
return sandboxes.get(workerSandbox);
}
function getUnsafeWindow (win) {
return win.wrappedJSObject || win;
}
function emitToContent (workerSandbox, args) {
return modelFor(workerSandbox).emitToContent(args);
}
function createChromeAPI () {
return {
timers: {
setTimeout: timer.setTimeout,
setInterval: timer.setInterval,
clearTimeout: timer.clearTimeout,
clearInterval: timer.clearInterval,
__exposedProps__: {
setTimeout: 'r',
setInterval: 'r',
clearTimeout: 'r',
clearInterval: 'r'
},
},
sandbox: {
evaluate: evaluate,
__exposedProps__: {
evaluate: 'r'
}
},
__exposedProps__: {
timers: 'r',
sandbox: 'r'
}
};
}