As Chrome has removed support for the HPKP (HTTP Public Key Pinning) header,
continuing to support it in Firefox is a compatibility risk. This patch adds
the preference "security.cert_pinning.hpkp.enabled" and sets it to false by
default. As such, the platform will no longer process the HPKP header nor
consult any cached HPKP information for certificate pins.
Preloaded (statically-compiled) pins are still enabled in Firefox by default.
This patch also disables dynamically setting pins via our remote security
settings infrastructure, as it uses the same backend and represents similar
compatibility risk.
Differential Revision: https://phabricator.services.mozilla.com/D52773
This patch provides Delegated Credential information (authKeyBits and signature scheme) to CertVerifier such that we can enforce a policy check and disallow weak keys in the Delegated Credential.
This information is not passed from http3 - adding this will be done in a separate bug.
Differential Revision: https://phabricator.services.mozilla.com/D47181
As originally implemented, nsISiteSecurityService.removeState allowed direct
access to remove HSTS state. It also provided the implementation for when the
browser encountered an HSTS header with "max-age=0". In bug 775370, it was
updated to store an entry that would override preloaded information when
processing such headers. However, this meant that the semantics of the direct
access API had changed. Preloaded information could be overridden if a user
invoked the "forget about this site" feature. This change fixes the public API
(and renames it to "resetState") so it actually behaves as its consumers expect.
Reviewers: jcj!, KevinJacobs!
Tags: #secure-revision
Bug #: 1564481
Differential Revision: https://phabricator.services.mozilla.com/D38108
Move all fields of nsISSLStatus to nsITransportSecurityProvider
Remove nsISSLStatus interface and definition
Update all code and test references to nsISSLStatus
Maintain ability to read in older version of serialized nsISSLStatus. This
is verified with psm_DeserializeCert gtest.
Differential Revision: https://phabricator.services.mozilla.com/D3704
Move all fields of nsISSLStatus to nsITransportSecurityProvider
Remove nsISSLStatus interface and definition
Update all code and test references to nsISSLStatus
Maintain ability to read in older version of serialized nsISSLStatus. This
is verified with psm_DeserializeCert gtest.
Differential Revision: https://phabricator.services.mozilla.com/D3704
This allows JS callers to automatically get the correct types during
interation, without having to explicitly specify them.
Differential Revision: https://phabricator.services.mozilla.com/D3728
This was done automatically replacing:
s/mozilla::Move/std::move/
s/ Move(/ std::move(/
s/(Move(/(std::move(/
Removing the 'using mozilla::Move;' lines.
And then with a few manual fixups, see the bug for the split series..
MozReview-Commit-ID: Jxze3adipUh
This commit reworks PublicKeyPinningService::ChainHasValidPins and
PublicKeyPinningService::EvalChain to use nsNSSCertList directly. It also
updates nsSiteSecurityService::ProcessPKPHeader. This will be made more
efficient in Bug 1406854, where the call to VerifySSLServerCert gets replaced
with one to GetSucceededCertChain. (Such a change is premeature now because
before Bug 731478 lands this would lead to a session resumption regression
causing pins to not be set properly, which is triggered repeatedly in the
xpcshell tests.)
MozReview-Commit-ID: 1l186n1lXLH
Bug 1364159 introduced an optimization that attempted to avoid reading from the
user's cached certificate database as much as possible when building a verified
certificate chain. Unfortunately this had the side-effect of not preferring root
certificates in path building, which can result in unnecessarily long chains
(which rather defeats the purpose, since it means more signature verifications).
This patch reverts the functionality changes from that bug but keeps the test
that was added (the test didn't directly test the functionality changes - it's
more of a check that path building will query the cached certificate db when
necessary).
MozReview-Commit-ID: I56THTLUytH
This switches the STS preload list over to a more compact representation by
using a DAFSA. `getHSTSPreloadList.js` is updated to output data in the gperf
format expected by `make_dafsa.py`. We then add a generated file that gets
created by pumping `nsSTSPreloadList.inc` through `make_dafsa.py`.
`nsSiteSecurityService` is updated to use the DAFSA which either returns -1
(kNotFound) if an entry is not present or (0, 1) indicating whether or not to
use subdomains.
`nsSTSPreloadList.inc` is an automated conversion to the new gperf-like format.
This switches the STS preload list over to a more compact representation by
using a DAFSA. `getHSTSPreloadList.js` is updated to output data in the gperf
format expected by `make_dafsa.py`. We then add a generated file that gets
created by pumping `nsSTSPreloadList.inc` through `make_dafsa.py`.
`nsSiteSecurityService` is updated to use the DAFSA which either returns -1
(kNotFound) if an entry is not present or (0, 1) indicating whether or not to
use subdomains.
`nsSTSPreloadList.inc` is an automated conversion to the new gperf-like format.
Add a field to the HSTS cache which indicates the source of the HSTS
entry if known, from the preload list, organically seen header, or HSTS
priming, or unknown otherwise. Also adds telemetry to collect the source
when upgrading in NS_ShouldSecureUpgrade.
MozReview-Commit-ID: 3IwyYe3Cn73
GetHostNameRaw() returns a char* string, which is less safe and ergonomic
compared to the Mozilla string classes. GetHostName() can be used instead.
MozReview-Commit-ID: GYvTnISNN35
CERT_CreateSubjectCertList is not an inexpensive function call, since it
enumerates the certificate database (i.e. reads from disk a lot). If we're
verifying for a TLS handshake, however, we should already have in memory a
certificate chain sent by the peer (there are some cases where we won't, such as
session resumption (see bug 731478)). If we can, we should use those
certificates before falling back to calling CERT_CreateSubjectCertList.
MozReview-Commit-ID: ASjVGsELb1O
While the uses of PR_sscanf() in PSM are safe, the function in general is
vulnerable to format string attacks, and so should be avoided.
This change removes the only uses of the function in PSM and moves to the more
obviously safe mozilla::Tokenizer.
MozReview-Commit-ID: J4BP6JTE1zI
There are a few places where we can use the safer functionality provided by the
Mozilla string classes instead.
Also fixes Bug 1268657 (remove vestigial
TransportSecurityInfo::SetShortSecurityDescription declaration).
MozReview-Commit-ID: Cxv5B4bsDua
The NSS Base64 functions are less safe and convenient to use than the XPCOM ones.
They're also an unnecessary dependency on NSS.
The NSS Base64 functions behave slightly differently than the XPCOM ones:
1. ATOB_ConvertAsciiToItem() / NSSBase64_DecodeBuffer() silently ignore invalid
characters like CRLF, space and so on. Base64Decode() will return an error
if these characters are encountered.
2. BTOA_DataToAscii() will produce output that has CRLF inserted every 64
characters. Base64Encode() doesn't do this.
For the reasons listed below, no unexpected compatibility issues should arise:
1. AppSignatureVerification.cpp already filters out CRLF and spaces for Manifest
and Signature values before decoding.
2. ExtendedValidation.cpp is only given what should be valid hard-coded input to
decode.
3. ContentSignatureVerifier.cpp already splits on CRLF for when it needs to
decode PEM certs. Spaces shouldn't be likely.
For Content-Signature header verification, examination of real input to a
running instance of Firefox suggests CRLF and spaces will not be present in
the header to decode.
4. nsCryptoHash.cpp encode is affected, but we actually don't want the CRLF
behaviour.
5. nsDataSignatureVerifier.cpp decode is affected, but we add whitespace
stripping to maintain backwards compatibility.
6. nsKeygenHandler.cpp encode is affected, but the previous CRLF behaviour was
arguably a bug, since neither WHATWG or W3C specs specified this.
MozReview-Commit-ID: IWMFxqVZMeX
MOZ_ASSERT_UNREACHABLE() is basically equivalent to NS_NOTREACHED().
PSM already uses MOZ_ASSERT_UNREACHABLE() for new code, so there's no need to use
NS_NOTREACHED() as well.
MozReview-Commit-ID: 9k2z9a1oIqe
MOZ_ASSERT() is basically equivalent to NS_ASSERTION().
PSM already uses MOZ_ASSERT() for new code, so there's no need to use
NS_ASSERTION() as well.
MozReview-Commit-ID: JHDsbDkYvHf
The PR_SetError() + PR_GetError() pattern currently used is error prone and
unnecessary. The functions involved can instead return mozilla::pkix::Result,
which is equally expressive and more robust.
MozReview-Commit-ID: Hkd39eqTvds
