This was done automatically replacing:
s/mozilla::Move/std::move/
s/ Move(/ std::move(/
s/(Move(/(std::move(/
Removing the 'using mozilla::Move;' lines.
And then with a few manual fixups, see the bug for the split series..
MozReview-Commit-ID: Jxze3adipUh
Note that by not using the same context pointer for all timestamps within a single
'communication group' (that is, all things that can communication to each other
in JavaScript), it's possible to observe time going backwards.
Imagine comparing
performance.timeOrigin + performance.now() < new File([], "").lastModified
In theory this should always be true. However, if performance.now() was jittered
up (using one context pointer, because it is a relative timestamp) and File was
jittered down (using a null context pointer, because it is an absolute timestamp)
then this may evaluate to False.
I think this is okay.
MozReview-Commit-ID: BfgbmGS8XdD
The change to RootAccessible.cpp fixes an obvious bug introduced in bug 741707.
The visibility changes in gfx/thebes are because NS_DECL_ISUPPORTS has a
trailing "public:" that those classes were relying on to have public
constructors.
MozReview-Commit-ID: IeB8KIJCGhU
This is a preexisting issue that makes nsMultiplexInputStream multiple-inherit
from nsIInputStream: once via nsIMultipartInputStream and once via
nsIAsyncInputStream. This causes problems once we end up with more multiplex
streams that are async streams, because then some assingments to
nsCOMPtr<nsIInputStream> start asserting. This patch just removes the footgun
by getting rid of the multiple inheritance.
This is a preexisting issue that makes nsMultiplexInputStream multiple-inherit
from nsIInputStream: once via nsIMultipartInputStream and once via
nsIAsyncInputStream. This causes problems once we end up with more multiplex
streams that are async streams, because then some assingments to
nsCOMPtr<nsIInputStream> start asserting. This patch just removes the footgun
by getting rid of the multiple inheritance.
This patch is adapted from Tor bug 1517.
To offer some protection against timing attacks by JS content pages, in this
patch we round the various time-exposing APIs (such as Date and
Event.timeStamps) to the nearest 100 ms when the pref "privacy.resistFingerprinting" is on.
MozReview-Commit-ID: eGucM9nGTn
