Backed out 3 changesets (bug 1905239) for causing build bustages @ FrontendContext.cpp CLOSED TREE

Backed out changeset 029305d7a99b (bug 1905239)
Backed out changeset a282ae3a55f7 (bug 1905239)
Backed out changeset f27e56ebfc0b (bug 1905239)

caps/nsScriptSecurityManager.cpp

@@ -73,8 +73,6 @@
 #include "nsJSUtils.h"
 #include "nsILoadInfo.h"
 #include "js/ColumnNumber.h"  // JS::ColumnNumberOneOrigin
-#include "js/GCVector.h"
-#include "js/Value.h"
 
 // This should be probably defined on some other place... but I couldn't find it
 #define WEBAPPS_PERM_NAME "webapps-manage"
@@ -464,12 +462,7 @@ NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS(nsScriptSecurityManager, nsIScriptSecurityManager)
 ///////////////// Security Checks /////////////////
 
 bool nsScriptSecurityManager::ContentSecurityPolicyPermitsJSAction(
-    JSContext* cx, JS::RuntimeCode aKind, JS::Handle<JSString*> aCodeString,
+    JSContext* cx, JS::RuntimeCode aKind, JS::Handle<JSString*> aCode) {
-    JS::CompilationType aCompilationType,
-    JS::Handle<JS::StackGCVector<JSString*>> aParameterStrings,
-    JS::Handle<JSString*> aBodyString,
-    JS::Handle<JS::StackGCVector<JS::Value>> aParameterArgs,
-    JS::Handle<JS::Value> aBodyArg, bool* aOutCanCompileStrings) {
   MOZ_ASSERT(cx == nsContentUtils::GetCurrentJSContext());
 
   nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> subjectPrincipal = nsContentUtils::SubjectPrincipal();
@@ -484,14 +477,13 @@ bool nsScriptSecurityManager::ContentSecurityPolicyPermitsJSAction(
   if (contextForbidsEval) {
     nsAutoJSString scriptSample;
     if (aKind == JS::RuntimeCode::JS &&
-        NS_WARN_IF(!scriptSample.init(cx, aCodeString))) {
+        NS_WARN_IF(!scriptSample.init(cx, aCode))) {
       return false;
     }
 
     if (!nsContentSecurityUtils::IsEvalAllowed(
             cx, subjectPrincipal->IsSystemPrincipal(), scriptSample)) {
-      *aOutCanCompileStrings = false;
+      return false;
-      return true;
     }
   }
 
@@ -511,7 +503,6 @@ bool nsScriptSecurityManager::ContentSecurityPolicyPermitsJSAction(
     }
     // don't do anything unless there's a CSP
     if (!csp) {
-      *aOutCanCompileStrings = true;
       return true;
     }
   }
@@ -531,8 +522,7 @@ bool nsScriptSecurityManager::ContentSecurityPolicyPermitsJSAction(
     nsresult rv = csp->GetAllowsEval(&reportViolation, &evalOK);
     if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
       NS_WARNING("CSP: failed to get allowsEval");
-      *aOutCanCompileStrings = true;  // fail open to not break sites.
+      return true;  // fail open to not break sites.
-      return true;
     }
   } else {
     if (NS_FAILED(csp->GetAllowsWasmEval(&reportViolation, &evalOK))) {
@@ -555,7 +545,8 @@ bool nsScriptSecurityManager::ContentSecurityPolicyPermitsJSAction(
     auto caller = JSCallingLocation::Get(cx);
     nsAutoJSString scriptSample;
     if (aKind == JS::RuntimeCode::JS &&
-        NS_WARN_IF(!scriptSample.init(cx, aCodeString))) {
+        NS_WARN_IF(!scriptSample.init(cx, aCode))) {
+      JS_ClearPendingException(cx);
       return false;
     }
     uint16_t violationType =
@@ -568,8 +559,7 @@ bool nsScriptSecurityManager::ContentSecurityPolicyPermitsJSAction(
                              caller.mLine, caller.mColumn, u""_ns, u""_ns);
   }
 
-  *aOutCanCompileStrings = evalOK;
+  return evalOK;
-  return true;
 }
 
 // static
@@ -1564,7 +1554,6 @@ void nsScriptSecurityManager::InitJSCallbacks(JSContext* aCx) {
 
   static const JSSecurityCallbacks securityCallbacks = {
       ContentSecurityPolicyPermitsJSAction,
-      nullptr,  // codeForEvalGets
       JSPrincipalsSubsume,
   };
 

caps/nsScriptSecurityManager.h

@@ -28,14 +28,17 @@ class SystemPrincipal;
 
 namespace JS {
 enum class RuntimeCode;
-enum class CompilationType;
 }  // namespace JS
 
 /////////////////////////////
 // nsScriptSecurityManager //
 /////////////////////////////
 #define NS_SCRIPTSECURITYMANAGER_CID                 \
-  {0x7ee2a4c0, 0x4b93, 0x17d3, {0xba, 0x18, 0x00, 0x60, 0xb0, 0xf1, 0x99, 0xa2}}
+  {                                                  \
+    0x7ee2a4c0, 0x4b93, 0x17d3, {                    \
+      0xba, 0x18, 0x00, 0x60, 0xb0, 0xf1, 0x99, 0xa2 \
+    }                                                \
+  }
 
 class nsScriptSecurityManager final : public nsIScriptSecurityManager {
  public:
@@ -88,13 +91,9 @@ class nsScriptSecurityManager final : public nsIScriptSecurityManager {
   virtual ~nsScriptSecurityManager();
 
   // Decides, based on CSP, whether or not eval() and stuff can be executed.
-  static bool ContentSecurityPolicyPermitsJSAction(
+  static bool ContentSecurityPolicyPermitsJSAction(JSContext* cx,
-      JSContext* aCx, JS::RuntimeCode aKind, JS::Handle<JSString*> aCodeString,
+                                                   JS::RuntimeCode kind,
-      JS::CompilationType aCompilationType,
+                                                   JS::Handle<JSString*> aCode);
-      JS::Handle<JS::StackGCVector<JSString*>> aParameterStrings,
-      JS::Handle<JSString*> aBodyString,
-      JS::Handle<JS::StackGCVector<JS::Value>> aParameterArgs,
-      JS::Handle<JS::Value> aBodyArg, bool* aOutCanCompileStrings);
 
   static bool JSPrincipalsSubsume(JSPrincipals* first, JSPrincipals* second);
 

dom/workers/RuntimeService.cpp

@@ -26,10 +26,8 @@
 #include "jsfriendapi.h"
 #include "js/friend/ErrorMessages.h"  // js::GetErrorMessage, JSMSG_*
 #include "js/ContextOptions.h"
-#include "js/GCVector.h"
 #include "js/Initialization.h"
 #include "js/LocaleSensitive.h"
-#include "js/Value.h"
 #include "js/WasmFeatures.h"
 #include "mozilla/ArrayUtils.h"
 #include "mozilla/Atomics.h"
@@ -501,13 +499,8 @@ class LogViolationDetailsRunnable final : public WorkerMainThreadRunnable {
   ~LogViolationDetailsRunnable() = default;
 };
 
-bool ContentSecurityPolicyAllows(
+bool ContentSecurityPolicyAllows(JSContext* aCx, JS::RuntimeCode aKind,
-    JSContext* aCx, JS::RuntimeCode aKind, JS::Handle<JSString*> aCodeString,
+                                 JS::Handle<JSString*> aCode) {
-    JS::CompilationType aCompilationType,
-    JS::Handle<JS::StackGCVector<JSString*>> aParameterStrings,
-    JS::Handle<JSString*> aBodyString,
-    JS::Handle<JS::StackGCVector<JS::Value>> aParameterArgs,
-    JS::Handle<JS::Value> aBodyArg, bool* aOutCanCompileStrings) {
   WorkerPrivate* worker = GetWorkerPrivateFromContext(aCx);
   worker->AssertIsOnWorkerThread();
 
@@ -516,14 +509,14 @@ bool ContentSecurityPolicyAllows(
   uint16_t violationType;
   nsAutoJSString scriptSample;
   if (aKind == JS::RuntimeCode::JS) {
-    if (NS_WARN_IF(!scriptSample.init(aCx, aCodeString))) {
+    if (NS_WARN_IF(!scriptSample.init(aCx, aCode))) {
+      JS_ClearPendingException(aCx);
       return false;
     }
 
     if (!nsContentSecurityUtils::IsEvalAllowed(
             aCx, worker->UsesSystemPrincipal(), scriptSample)) {
-      *aOutCanCompileStrings = false;
+      return false;
-      return true;
     }
 
     evalOK = worker->IsEvalAllowed();
@@ -549,8 +542,7 @@ bool ContentSecurityPolicyAllows(
     }
   }
 
-  *aOutCanCompileStrings = evalOK;
+  return evalOK;
-  return true;
 }
 
 void CTypesActivityCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::CTypesActivityType aType) {

js/public/Principals.h

@@ -77,54 +77,23 @@ typedef bool (*JSSubsumesOp)(JSPrincipals* first, JSPrincipals* second);
 
 namespace JS {
 enum class RuntimeCode { JS, WASM };
-enum class CompilationType { DirectEval, IndirectEval, Function, Undefined };
 }  // namespace JS
 
 /*
  * Used to check if a CSP instance wants to disable eval() and friends.
  * See JSContext::isRuntimeCodeGenEnabled() in vm/JSContext.cpp.
  *
- * codeString, compilationType, parameterStrings, bodyString, parameterArgs,
+ * `code` is the JavaScript source code passed to eval/Function, but nullptr
- * and bodyArg are defined in the "Dynamic Code Brand Checks" spec
+ * for Wasm.
- * (see https://tc39.es/proposal-dynamic-code-brand-checks).
  *
- * An Undefined compilationType is used for cases that are not covered by that
+ * Returning `false` from this callback will prevent the execution/compilation
- * spec and unused parameters are null/empty. Currently, this includes Wasm
+ * of the code.
- * (only check if compilation is enabled) and ShadowRealmEval (only check
- * codeString).
- *
- * `outCanCompileStrings` is set to false if this callback prevents the
- * execution/compilation of the code and to true otherwise.
- *
- * Return false on failure, true on success. The |outCanCompileStrings|
- * parameter should not be modified in case of failure.
  */
-typedef bool (*JSCSPEvalChecker)(
+typedef bool (*JSCSPEvalChecker)(JSContext* cx, JS::RuntimeCode kind,
-    JSContext* cx, JS::RuntimeCode kind, JS::Handle<JSString*> codeString,
+                                 JS::HandleString code);
-    JS::CompilationType compilationType,
-    JS::Handle<JS::StackGCVector<JSString*>> parameterStrings,
-    JS::Handle<JSString*> bodyString,
-    JS::Handle<JS::StackGCVector<JS::Value>> parameterArgs,
-    JS::Handle<JS::Value> bodyArg, bool* outCanCompileStrings);
-
-/*
- * Provide a string of code from an Object argument, to be used by eval.
- * See JSContext::getCodeForEval() in vm/JSContext.cpp as well as
- * https://tc39.es/proposal-dynamic-code-brand-checks/#sec-hostgetcodeforeval
- *
- * `code` is the JavaScript object passed by the user.
- * `outCode` is the JavaScript string to be actually executed, with nullptr
- *  meaning NO-CODE.
- *
- * Return false on failure, true on success. The |outCode| parameter should not
- * be modified in case of failure.
- */
-typedef bool (*JSCodeForEvalOp)(JSContext* cx, JS::HandleObject code,
-                                JS::MutableHandle<JSString*> outCode);
 
 struct JSSecurityCallbacks {
   JSCSPEvalChecker contentSecurityPolicyAllows;
-  JSCodeForEvalOp codeForEvalGets;
   JSSubsumesOp subsumes;
 };
 

js/src/builtin/Eval.cpp

@@ -239,41 +239,21 @@ static bool EvalKernel(JSContext* cx, HandleValue v, EvalType evalType,
                 env->is<GlobalLexicalEnvironmentObject>());
   AssertInnerizedEnvironmentChain(cx, *env);
 
-  // "Dynamic Code Brand Checks" adds support for Object values.
+  // Step 2.
-  // https://tc39.es/proposal-dynamic-code-brand-checks/#sec-performeval
+  if (!v.isString()) {
-  // Steps 2-4.
-  RootedString str(cx);
-  if (v.isString()) {
-    str = v.toString();
-  } else if (v.isObject()) {
-    RootedObject obj(cx, &v.toObject());
-    if (!cx->getCodeForEval(obj, &str)) {
-      return false;
-    }
-  }
-  if (!str) {
     vp.set(v);
     return true;
   }
 
-  // Steps 6-8.
+  // Steps 3-4.
-  JS::RootedVector<JSString*> parameterStrings(cx);
+  RootedString str(cx, v.toString());
-  JS::RootedVector<Value> parameterArgs(cx);
+  if (!cx->isRuntimeCodeGenEnabled(JS::RuntimeCode::JS, str)) {
-  bool canCompileStrings = false;
-  if (!cx->isRuntimeCodeGenEnabled(
-          JS::RuntimeCode::JS, str,
-          evalType == DIRECT_EVAL ? JS::CompilationType::DirectEval
-                                  : JS::CompilationType::IndirectEval,
-          parameterStrings, str, parameterArgs, v, &canCompileStrings)) {
-    return false;
-  }
-  if (!canCompileStrings) {
     JS_ReportErrorNumberASCII(cx, GetErrorMessage, nullptr,
                               JSMSG_CSP_BLOCKED_EVAL);
     return false;
   }
 
-  // Step 9 ff.
+  // Step 5 ff.
 
   // Per ES5, indirect eval runs in the global scope. (eval is specified this
   // way so that the compiler can make assumptions about what bindings may or

js/src/builtin/ShadowRealm.cpp

@@ -196,16 +196,7 @@ static bool PerformShadowRealmEval(JSContext* cx, Handle<JSString*> sourceText,
   MOZ_ASSERT(callerRealm != evalRealm);
 
   // Step 1. Perform ? HostEnsureCanCompileStrings(callerRealm, evalRealm).
-  JS::RootedVector<JSString*> parameterStrings(cx);
+  if (!cx->isRuntimeCodeGenEnabled(JS::RuntimeCode::JS, sourceText)) {
-  JS::RootedVector<Value> parameterArgs(cx);
-  bool canCompileStrings = false;
-  if (!cx->isRuntimeCodeGenEnabled(JS::RuntimeCode::JS, sourceText,
-                                   JS::CompilationType::Undefined,
-                                   parameterStrings, nullptr, parameterArgs,
-                                   NullHandleValue, &canCompileStrings)) {
-    return false;
-  }
-  if (!canCompileStrings) {
     JS_ReportErrorNumberASCII(cx, GetErrorMessage, nullptr,
                               JSMSG_CSP_BLOCKED_SHADOWREALM);
     return false;

js/src/jsapi-tests/moz.build

@@ -40,7 +40,6 @@ UNIFIED_SOURCES += [
     "testDeflateStringToUTF8Buffer.cpp",
     "testDeleteProperty.cpp",
     "testDifferentNewTargetInvokeConstructor.cpp",
-    "testDynamicCodeBrandChecks.cpp",
     "testEmptyWindowIsOmitted.cpp",
     "testErrorCopying.cpp",
     "testErrorLineOfContext.cpp",

js/src/jsapi-tests/testDynamicCodeBrandChecks.cpp

@@ -1,269 +0,0 @@
-/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*-
- * vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80:
- *
- * Tests that the column number of error reports is properly copied over from
- * other reports when invoked from the C++ api.
- */
-/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
- * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
- * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
-
-#include "jsapi-tests/tests.h"
-
-BEGIN_TEST(testDynamicCodeBrandChecks_DefaultHostGetCodeForEval) {
-  JS::RootedValue v(cx);
-
-  // String arguments are evaluated.
-  EVAL("eval('5*8');", &v);
-  CHECK(v.isNumber() && v.toNumber() == 40);
-
-  // Other arguments are returned as is by eval.
-  EVAL("eval({myProp: 41});", &v);
-  CHECK(v.isObject());
-  JS::RootedObject obj(cx, &v.toObject());
-  JS::RootedValue myProp(cx);
-  CHECK(JS_GetProperty(cx, obj, "myProp", &myProp));
-  CHECK(myProp.isNumber() && myProp.toNumber() == 41);
-
-  EVAL("eval({trustedCode: '6*7'}).trustedCode;", &v);
-  CHECK(v.isString());
-  JSString* str = v.toString();
-  CHECK(JS_LinearStringEqualsLiteral(JS_ASSERT_STRING_IS_LINEAR(str), "6*7"));
-
-  EVAL("eval({trustedCode: 42}).trustedCode;", &v);
-  CHECK(v.isNumber() && v.toNumber() == 42);
-
-  return true;
-}
-END_TEST(testDynamicCodeBrandChecks_DefaultHostGetCodeForEval)
-
-static bool ExtractTrustedCodeStringProperty(
-    JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JSObject*> aCode,
-    JS::MutableHandle<JSString*> outCode) {
-  JS::RootedValue value(aCx);
-  if (!JS_GetProperty(aCx, aCode, "trustedCode", &value)) {
-    return false;
-  }
-  if (value.isUndefined()) {
-    // If the property is undefined, return NO-CODE.
-    outCode.set(nullptr);
-    return true;
-  }
-  if (value.isString()) {
-    // If the property is a string, return it.
-    outCode.set(value.toString());
-    return true;
-  }
-  // Otherwise, emulate a failure.
-  JS_ReportErrorASCII(aCx, "Unsupported value for trustedCode property");
-  return false;
-}
-
-BEGIN_TEST(testDynamicCodeBrandChecks_CustomHostGetCodeForEval) {
-  JSSecurityCallbacks securityCallbacksWithEvalAcceptingObject = {
-      nullptr,                           // contentSecurityPolicyAllows
-      ExtractTrustedCodeStringProperty,  // codeForEvalGets
-      nullptr                            // subsumes
-  };
-  JS_SetSecurityCallbacks(cx, &securityCallbacksWithEvalAcceptingObject);
-  JS::RootedValue v(cx);
-
-  // String arguments are evaluated.
-  EVAL("eval('5*8');", &v);
-  CHECK(v.isNumber() && v.toNumber() == 40);
-
-  // Other arguments are returned as is by eval...
-  EVAL("eval({myProp: 41});", &v);
-  CHECK(v.isObject());
-  JS::RootedObject obj(cx, &v.toObject());
-  JS::RootedValue myProp(cx);
-  CHECK(JS_GetProperty(cx, obj, "myProp", &myProp));
-  CHECK(myProp.isNumber() && myProp.toNumber() == 41);
-
-  // ... but Objects are first tentatively converted to String by the
-  // codeForEvalGets callback.
-  EVAL("eval({trustedCode: '6*7'});", &v);
-  CHECK(v.isNumber() && v.toNumber() == 6 * 7);
-
-  // And if that codeForEvalGets callback fails, then so does the eval call.
-  CHECK(!execDontReport("eval({trustedCode: 6*7});", __FILE__, __LINE__));
-
-  return true;
-}
-END_TEST(testDynamicCodeBrandChecks_CustomHostGetCodeForEval)
-
-// This snippet defines a TrustedType that wraps some trustedCode string and
-// stringifies to that string, as well as a helper to create a fake instance
-// that can stringify to a different string.
-const char* customTypesSnippet =
-    "function TrustedType(aTrustedCode) { this.trustedCode = aTrustedCode; };"
-    "TrustedType.prototype.toString = function() { return this.trustedCode; };"
-    "function CreateFakeTrustedType(aTrustedCode, aString) {"
-    "  let fake = new TrustedType(aTrustedCode);"
-    "  fake.toString = () => { return aString; };"
-    "  return fake;"
-    "};";
-
-BEGIN_TEST(testDynamicCodeBrandChecks_CustomHostEnsureCanCompileStrings) {
-  JSSecurityCallbacks securityCallbacksWithCustomHostEnsureCanCompileStrings = {
-      StringifiedObjectsMatchTrustedCodeProperties,  // contentSecurityPolicyAllows
-      ExtractTrustedCodeStringProperty,              // codeForEvalGets
-      nullptr                                        // subsumes
-  };
-  JS_SetSecurityCallbacks(
-      cx, &securityCallbacksWithCustomHostEnsureCanCompileStrings);
-  JS::RootedValue v(cx);
-
-  EXEC(customTypesSnippet);
-
-  // String arguments are evaluated.
-  EVAL("eval('5*8');", &v);
-  CHECK(v.isNumber() && v.toNumber() == 40);
-  EVAL("(new Function('a', 'b', 'return a * b'))(6, 7);", &v);
-  CHECK(v.isNumber() && v.toNumber() == 42);
-
-  // The same works with TrustedType wrappers.
-  EVAL("eval(new TrustedType('5*8'));", &v);
-  CHECK(v.isNumber() && v.toNumber() == 40);
-  EVAL(
-      "(new Function(new TrustedType('a'), new TrustedType('b'), new "
-      "TrustedType('return a * b')))(6, 7);",
-      &v);
-  CHECK(v.isNumber() && v.toNumber() == 42);
-
-  // new Function fails if one of the stringified argument does not match the
-  // trustedCode property.
-  CHECK(!execDontReport(
-      "new Function(CreateFakeTrustedType('a', 'c'), 'b', 'return b');",
-      __FILE__, __LINE__));
-  CHECK(!execDontReport(
-      "new Function('a', CreateFakeTrustedType('b', 'c'), 'return a');",
-      __FILE__, __LINE__));
-  CHECK(
-      !execDontReport("new Function('a', 'b', CreateFakeTrustedType('return a "
-                      "* b', 'return a + b'));",
-                      __FILE__, __LINE__));
-
-  // new Function also fails if StringifiedObjectsMatchTrustedCodeProperties
-  // returns false.
-  CHECK(!execDontReport("new Function('a', 'b', new TrustedType(undefined));",
-                        __FILE__, __LINE__));
-
-  // PerformEval relies on ExtractTrustedCodeProperty rather than toString() to
-  // obtain the code to execute, so StringifiedObjectsMatchTrustedCodeProperties
-  // will always allow the code execution for the specified security callbacks.
-  EVAL("eval(CreateFakeTrustedType('5*8', '6*7'));", &v);
-  CHECK(v.isNumber() && v.toNumber() == 40);
-  EVAL("eval(new TrustedType(undefined));", &v);
-  CHECK(v.isObject());
-  JS::RootedObject obj(cx, &v.toObject());
-  JS::RootedValue trustedCode(cx);
-  CHECK(JS_GetProperty(cx, obj, "trustedCode", &trustedCode));
-  CHECK(trustedCode.isUndefined());
-
-  return true;
-}
-
-// This is a HostEnsureCanCompileStrings() implementation similar to some checks
-// described in the CSP spec: verify that aBodyString and aParameterStrings
-// match the corresponding trustedCode property on aBodyArg and aParameterArgs
-// objects. See https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-csp/#can-compile-strings
-static bool StringifiedObjectsMatchTrustedCodeProperties(
-    JSContext* aCx, JS::RuntimeCode aKind, JS::Handle<JSString*> aCodeString,
-    JS::CompilationType aCompilationType,
-    JS::Handle<JS::StackGCVector<JSString*>> aParameterStrings,
-    JS::Handle<JSString*> aBodyString,
-    JS::Handle<JS::StackGCVector<JS::Value>> aParameterArgs,
-    JS::Handle<JS::Value> aBodyArg, bool* aOutCanCompileStrings) {
-  bool isTrusted = true;
-  auto comparePropertyAndString = [&aCx, &isTrusted](
-                                      JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue,
-                                      JS::Handle<JSString*> aString) {
-    if (!aValue.isObject()) {
-      // Just trust non-Objects.
-      return true;
-    }
-    JS::RootedObject obj(aCx, &aValue.toObject());
-
-    JS::RootedString trustedCode(aCx);
-    if (!ExtractTrustedCodeStringProperty(aCx, obj, &trustedCode)) {
-      // Propagate the failure.
-      return false;
-    }
-    if (!trustedCode) {
-      // Emulate a failure if trustedCode is undefined.
-      JS_ReportErrorASCII(aCx,
-                          "test failed, trustedCode property is undefined");
-      return false;
-    }
-    bool equals;
-    if (!EqualStrings(aCx, trustedCode, aString, &equals)) {
-      // Propagate the failure.
-      return false;
-    }
-    if (!equals) {
-      isTrusted = false;
-    }
-    return true;
-  };
-  if (!comparePropertyAndString(aBodyArg, aBodyString)) {
-    // Propagate the failure.
-    return false;
-  }
-  if (isTrusted) {
-    MOZ_ASSERT(aParameterArgs.length() == aParameterStrings.length());
-    for (size_t index = 0; index < aParameterArgs.length(); index++) {
-      if (!comparePropertyAndString(aParameterArgs[index],
-                                    aParameterStrings[index])) {
-        // Propagate the failure.
-        return false;
-      }
-      if (!isTrusted) {
-        break;
-      }
-    }
-  }
-  // Allow compilation if arguments are trusted.
-  *aOutCanCompileStrings = isTrusted;
-  return true;
-}
-
-END_TEST(testDynamicCodeBrandChecks_CustomHostEnsureCanCompileStrings)
-
-BEGIN_TEST(testDynamicCodeBrandChecks_RejectObjectForEval) {
-  JSSecurityCallbacks securityCallbacksRejectObjectBody = {
-      DisallowObjectsAndFailOtherwise,   // contentSecurityPolicyAllows
-      ExtractTrustedCodeStringProperty,  // codeForEvalGets
-      nullptr                            // subsumes
-  };
-
-  JS_SetSecurityCallbacks(cx, &securityCallbacksRejectObjectBody);
-  JS::RootedValue v(cx);
-
-  EXEC(customTypesSnippet);
-
-  // With the specified security callbacks, eval() will always fail.
-  CHECK(!execDontReport("eval('5*8))", __FILE__, __LINE__));
-  CHECK(!execDontReport("eval(new TrustedType('5*8'))", __FILE__, __LINE__));
-
-  return true;
-}
-
-static bool DisallowObjectsAndFailOtherwise(
-    JSContext* aCx, JS::RuntimeCode aKind, JS::Handle<JSString*> aCodeString,
-    JS::CompilationType aCompilationType,
-    JS::Handle<JS::StackGCVector<JSString*>> aParameterStrings,
-    JS::Handle<JSString*> aBodyString,
-    JS::Handle<JS::StackGCVector<JS::Value>> aParameterArgs,
-    JS::Handle<JS::Value> aBodyArg, bool* aOutCanCompileStrings) {
-  if (aBodyArg.isObject()) {
-    // Disallow compilation for objects.
-    *aOutCanCompileStrings = false;
-    return true;
-  }
-  // Otherwise, emulate a failure.
-  JS_ReportErrorASCII(aCx, "aBodyArg is not an Object");
-  return false;
-}
-
-END_TEST(testDynamicCodeBrandChecks_RejectObjectForEval)

js/src/jsapi-tests/testStructuredClone.cpp

@@ -258,7 +258,6 @@ struct StructuredCloneTestPrincipals final : public JSPrincipals {
 
 JSSecurityCallbacks StructuredCloneTestPrincipals::securityCallbacks = {
     nullptr,  // contentSecurityPolicyAllows
-    nullptr,  // codeForEvalGets
     subsumes};
 
 BEGIN_TEST(testStructuredClone_SavedFrame) {

js/src/shell/js.cpp

@@ -955,7 +955,6 @@ class ShellPrincipals final : public JSPrincipals {
 
 JSSecurityCallbacks ShellPrincipals::securityCallbacks = {
     nullptr,  // contentSecurityPolicyAllows
-    nullptr,  // codeForEvalGets
     subsumes};
 
 // The fully-trusted principal subsumes all other principals.

js/src/vm/JSContext.cpp

@@ -1233,35 +1233,15 @@ bool JSContext::isThrowingDebuggeeWouldRun() {
              JSEXN_DEBUGGEEWOULDRUN;
 }
 
-bool JSContext::isRuntimeCodeGenEnabled(
+bool JSContext::isRuntimeCodeGenEnabled(JS::RuntimeCode kind,
-    JS::RuntimeCode kind, JS::Handle<JSString*> codeString,
+                                        HandleString code) {
-    JS::CompilationType compilationType,
-    JS::Handle<JS::StackGCVector<JSString*>> parameterStrings,
-    JS::Handle<JSString*> bodyString,
-    JS::Handle<JS::StackGCVector<JS::Value>> parameterArgs,
-    JS::Handle<JS::Value> bodyArg, bool* outCanCompileStrings) {
   // Make sure that the CSP callback is installed and that it permits runtime
   // code generation.
   if (JSCSPEvalChecker allows =
           runtime()->securityCallbacks->contentSecurityPolicyAllows) {
-    return allows(this, kind, codeString, compilationType, parameterStrings,
+    return allows(this, kind, code);
-                  bodyString, parameterArgs, bodyArg, outCanCompileStrings);
   }
 
-  // Default implementation from the "Dynamic Code Brand Checks" spec.
-  // https://tc39.es/proposal-dynamic-code-brand-checks/#sec-hostensurecancompilestrings
-  *outCanCompileStrings = true;
-  return true;
-}
-
-bool JSContext::getCodeForEval(HandleObject code,
-                               JS::MutableHandle<JSString*> outCode) {
-  if (JSCodeForEvalOp gets = runtime()->securityCallbacks->codeForEvalGets) {
-    return gets(this, code, outCode);
-  }
-  // Default implementation from the "Dynamic Code Brand Checks" spec.
-  // https://tc39.es/proposal-dynamic-code-brand-checks/#sec-hostgetcodeforeval
-  outCode.set(nullptr);
   return true;
 }
 

js/src/vm/JSContext.h

@@ -803,17 +803,7 @@ struct JS_PUBLIC_API JSContext : public JS::RootingContext,
 
   // Checks if the page's Content-Security-Policy (CSP) allows
   // runtime code generation "unsafe-eval", or "wasm-unsafe-eval" for Wasm.
-  bool isRuntimeCodeGenEnabled(
+  bool isRuntimeCodeGenEnabled(JS::RuntimeCode kind, js::HandleString code);
-      JS::RuntimeCode kind, JS::Handle<JSString*> codeString,
-      JS::CompilationType compilationType,
-      JS::Handle<JS::StackGCVector<JSString*>> parameterStrings,
-      JS::Handle<JSString*> bodyString,
-      JS::Handle<JS::StackGCVector<JS::Value>> parameterArgs,
-      JS::Handle<JS::Value> bodyArg, bool* outCanCompileStrings);
-
-  // Get code to be used by eval for Object argument.
-  bool getCodeForEval(JS::HandleObject code,
-                      JS::MutableHandle<JSString*> outCode);
 
   size_t sizeOfExcludingThis(mozilla::MallocSizeOf mallocSizeOf) const;
   size_t sizeOfIncludingThis(mozilla::MallocSizeOf mallocSizeOf) const;

js/src/vm/JSFunction.cpp

@@ -1346,32 +1346,19 @@ static bool CreateDynamicFunction(JSContext* cx, const CallArgs& args,
     return false;
   }
 
-  JS::RootedVector<JSString*> parameterStrings(cx);
-  JS::RootedVector<Value> parameterArgs(cx);
   if (args.length() > 1) {
     RootedString str(cx);
 
     // Steps 10, 14.d.
     unsigned n = args.length() - 1;
-    if (!parameterStrings.reserve(n) || !parameterArgs.reserve(n)) {
-      return false;
-    }
 
     for (unsigned i = 0; i < n; i++) {
-      if (!parameterArgs.append(args[i])) {
-        return false;
-      }
-
       // Steps 14.a-b, 14.d.i-ii.
       str = ToString<CanGC>(cx, args[i]);
       if (!str) {
         return false;
       }
 
-      if (!parameterStrings.append(str)) {
-        return false;
-      }
-
       // Steps 14.b, 14.d.iii.
       if (!sb.append(str)) {
         return false;
@@ -1399,13 +1386,10 @@ static bool CreateDynamicFunction(JSContext* cx, const CallArgs& args,
     return false;
   }
 
-  JS::RootedValue bodyArg(cx);
-  RootedString bodyString(cx);
   if (args.length() > 0) {
     // Steps 13, 14.e, 15.
-    bodyArg = args[args.length() - 1];
+    RootedString body(cx, ToString<CanGC>(cx, args[args.length() - 1]));
-    bodyString = ToString<CanGC>(cx, bodyArg);
+    if (!body || !sb.append(body)) {
-    if (!bodyString || !sb.append(bodyString)) {
       return false;
     }
   }
@@ -1426,14 +1410,7 @@ static bool CreateDynamicFunction(JSContext* cx, const CallArgs& args,
   }
 
   // Block this call if security callbacks forbid it.
-  bool canCompileStrings = false;
+  if (!cx->isRuntimeCodeGenEnabled(JS::RuntimeCode::JS, functionText)) {
-  if (!cx->isRuntimeCodeGenEnabled(JS::RuntimeCode::JS, functionText,
-                                   JS::CompilationType::Function,
-                                   parameterStrings, bodyString, parameterArgs,
-                                   bodyArg, &canCompileStrings)) {
-    return false;
-  }
-  if (!canCompileStrings) {
     JS_ReportErrorNumberASCII(cx, GetErrorMessage, nullptr,
                               JSMSG_CSP_BLOCKED_FUNCTION);
     return false;

js/src/wasm/WasmJS.cpp

@@ -1619,16 +1619,7 @@ bool WasmModuleObject::construct(JSContext* cx, unsigned argc, Value* vp) {
     return false;
   }
 
-  JS::RootedVector<JSString*> parameterStrings(cx);
+  if (!cx->isRuntimeCodeGenEnabled(JS::RuntimeCode::WASM, nullptr)) {
-  JS::RootedVector<Value> parameterArgs(cx);
-  bool canCompileStrings = false;
-  if (!cx->isRuntimeCodeGenEnabled(JS::RuntimeCode::WASM, nullptr,
-                                   JS::CompilationType::Undefined,
-                                   parameterStrings, nullptr, parameterArgs,
-                                   NullHandleValue, &canCompileStrings)) {
-    return false;
-  }
-  if (!canCompileStrings) {
     JS_ReportErrorNumberASCII(cx, GetErrorMessage, nullptr,
                               JSMSG_CSP_BLOCKED_WASM, "WebAssembly.Module");
     return false;
@@ -4446,16 +4437,7 @@ static bool WebAssembly_compile(JSContext* cx, unsigned argc, Value* vp) {
 
   CallArgs callArgs = CallArgsFromVp(argc, vp);
 
-  JS::RootedVector<JSString*> parameterStrings(cx);
+  if (!cx->isRuntimeCodeGenEnabled(JS::RuntimeCode::WASM, nullptr)) {
-  JS::RootedVector<Value> parameterArgs(cx);
-  bool canCompileStrings = false;
-  if (!cx->isRuntimeCodeGenEnabled(JS::RuntimeCode::WASM, nullptr,
-                                   JS::CompilationType::Undefined,
-                                   parameterStrings, nullptr, parameterArgs,
-                                   NullHandleValue, &canCompileStrings)) {
-    return RejectWithPendingException(cx, promise, callArgs);
-  }
-  if (!canCompileStrings) {
     JS_ReportErrorNumberASCII(cx, GetErrorMessage, nullptr,
                               JSMSG_CSP_BLOCKED_WASM, "WebAssembly.compile");
     return RejectWithPendingException(cx, promise, callArgs);
@@ -4539,16 +4521,7 @@ static bool WebAssembly_instantiate(JSContext* cx, unsigned argc, Value* vp) {
       return false;
     }
   } else {
-    JS::RootedVector<JSString*> parameterStrings(cx);
+    if (!cx->isRuntimeCodeGenEnabled(JS::RuntimeCode::WASM, nullptr)) {
-    JS::RootedVector<Value> parameterArgs(cx);
-    bool canCompileStrings = false;
-    if (!cx->isRuntimeCodeGenEnabled(JS::RuntimeCode::WASM, nullptr,
-                                     JS::CompilationType::Undefined,
-                                     parameterStrings, nullptr, parameterArgs,
-                                     NullHandleValue, &canCompileStrings)) {
-      return RejectWithPendingException(cx, promise, callArgs);
-    }
-    if (!canCompileStrings) {
       JS_ReportErrorNumberASCII(cx, GetErrorMessage, nullptr,
                                 JSMSG_CSP_BLOCKED_WASM,
                                 "WebAssembly.instantiate");
@@ -5141,16 +5114,7 @@ static bool WebAssembly_compileStreaming(JSContext* cx, unsigned argc,
 
   CallArgs callArgs = CallArgsFromVp(argc, vp);
 
-  JS::RootedVector<JSString*> parameterStrings(cx);
+  if (!cx->isRuntimeCodeGenEnabled(JS::RuntimeCode::WASM, nullptr)) {
-  JS::RootedVector<Value> parameterArgs(cx);
-  bool canCompileStrings = false;
-  if (!cx->isRuntimeCodeGenEnabled(JS::RuntimeCode::WASM, nullptr,
-                                   JS::CompilationType::Undefined,
-                                   parameterStrings, nullptr, parameterArgs,
-                                   NullHandleValue, &canCompileStrings)) {
-    return RejectWithPendingException(cx, resultPromise, callArgs);
-  }
-  if (!canCompileStrings) {
     JS_ReportErrorNumberASCII(cx, GetErrorMessage, nullptr,
                               JSMSG_CSP_BLOCKED_WASM,
                               "WebAssembly.compileStreaming");
@@ -5183,16 +5147,7 @@ static bool WebAssembly_instantiateStreaming(JSContext* cx, unsigned argc,
 
   CallArgs callArgs = CallArgsFromVp(argc, vp);
 
-  JS::RootedVector<JSString*> parameterStrings(cx);
+  if (!cx->isRuntimeCodeGenEnabled(JS::RuntimeCode::WASM, nullptr)) {
-  JS::RootedVector<Value> parameterArgs(cx);
-  bool canCompileStrings = false;
-  if (!cx->isRuntimeCodeGenEnabled(JS::RuntimeCode::WASM, nullptr,
-                                   JS::CompilationType::Undefined,
-                                   parameterStrings, nullptr, parameterArgs,
-                                   NullHandleValue, &canCompileStrings)) {
-    return RejectWithPendingException(cx, resultPromise, callArgs);
-  }
-  if (!canCompileStrings) {
     JS_ReportErrorNumberASCII(cx, GetErrorMessage, nullptr,
                               JSMSG_CSP_BLOCKED_WASM,
                               "WebAssembly.instantiateStreaming");

js/src/wasm/WasmModule.cpp

@@ -206,16 +206,7 @@ JSObject* Module::createObject(JSContext* cx) const {
     return nullptr;
   }
 
-  JS::RootedVector<JSString*> parameterStrings(cx);
+  if (!cx->isRuntimeCodeGenEnabled(JS::RuntimeCode::WASM, nullptr)) {
-  JS::RootedVector<Value> parameterArgs(cx);
-  bool canCompileStrings = false;
-  if (!cx->isRuntimeCodeGenEnabled(JS::RuntimeCode::WASM, nullptr,
-                                   JS::CompilationType::Undefined,
-                                   parameterStrings, nullptr, parameterArgs,
-                                   NullHandleValue, &canCompileStrings)) {
-    return nullptr;
-  }
-  if (!canCompileStrings) {
     JS_ReportErrorNumberASCII(cx, GetErrorMessage, nullptr,
                               JSMSG_CSP_BLOCKED_WASM, "WebAssembly.Module");
     return nullptr;